No. 42791. United Nations and Democratic Republic of the Congo

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-132
Author(s):  
János Tomolya

In June 2003, the EU launched Operation “Artemis”, its first military mission outside Europe and independent of NATO, to the Democratic Republic of Congo. While it ultimately received an EU badge, its origin, command and control were French. The objective of Operation “Artemis” was to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in Bunia, capital of Ituri, to improve the humanitarian situation, and to ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia. Its mandate was to provide a short-term interim force for three months until the transition to the reinforced United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC – Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo; English: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Although the EU can be said to have passed the first “test” of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mechanisms for the conduct of an autonomous operation, this test was a limited one. Operational constraints were caused by inadequate strategic lift capabilities and the lack of a strategic reserve.


2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-448
Author(s):  
Julieta Solano McCausland ◽  
Enrique Carnero Rojo

Abstract This column covers the activity of the International Criminal Court during the last third of 2010 through mid-May 2011. The Court has continued investigating situations in five countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Kenya) and opened a new investigation following a referral by the United Nations Security Council (Libya). The judicial activity of the Court continued with four accused persons undergoing trial, two more waiting for their trial to start, and six more awaiting the confirmation of charges hearing. The Chambers of the Court continued to develop the rules applicable to pre-trial and trial proceedings. In the period covered by this column they confirmed the law on the admissibility of a case, ruled on the proceedings concerning the first challenge by a State to the admissibility of a case and on stay of proceedings, and brought consistency on the issue of victim participation across cases.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.


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