scholarly journals Overcoming Opposition at the UNSC: Regional Multilateralism as a Form of Collective Pressure

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Iraq War ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Republic Of The Congo ◽  
The United Nations

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.

scholarly journals States, firms, and security: How private actors implement sanctions, lessons learned from the Netherlands

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
For Profit ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Private Actors

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 & Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-195
Author(s):  
Michael D. Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Proper Solution ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
The United Nations

For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”

Course Corrections: The Obama Administration at the United Nations

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 335-349
Author(s):  
David Bosco
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Most Significant Change ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Significant Change

Less has changed in US diplomacy at the United Nations than many observers expected when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In the UN Security Council, the United States has pursued a generally steady course that in many respects builds on the accomplishments of the Bush administration. Unexpectedly, the Security Council’s pace of work diminished considerably during the first few years of the new administration. The most significant change is the atmospherics of US diplomacy, not its substance: the Obama administration has participated in processes that the Bush administration shunned and has toned down US criticism of the United Nations’ perceived shortcomings.

Estados Unidos-Brasil: da transição de presidentes à diferença de atuação na América Latina

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virgílio Caixeta Arraes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Sporting Events ◽  
Final Phase ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
America Latina

The article deals with the final phase of Lula da Silva’s foreign policy toward the United States (2009-2010). The topics dealt with are Dilma Rousseff’s candidacy to the Brazilian presidency; the Brazilian borders considering US presence in Colombia; Brazil’s permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council; hosting of international sporting events under the auspices of ‘playful diplomacy’; attempt to reach a diplomatic understanding of Iran’s nuclear program and Haiti’s earthquake.

Developments at the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-448
Author(s):  
Julieta Solano McCausland ◽  
Enrique Carnero Rojo
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Central African Republic ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Republic Of The Congo ◽  
Victim Participation

Abstract This column covers the activity of the International Criminal Court during the last third of 2010 through mid-May 2011. The Court has continued investigating situations in five countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Kenya) and opened a new investigation following a referral by the United Nations Security Council (Libya). The judicial activity of the Court continued with four accused persons undergoing trial, two more waiting for their trial to start, and six more awaiting the confirmation of charges hearing. The Chambers of the Court continued to develop the rules applicable to pre-trial and trial proceedings. In the period covered by this column they confirmed the law on the admissibility of a case, ruled on the proceedings concerning the first challenge by a State to the admissibility of a case and on stay of proceedings, and brought consistency on the issue of victim participation across cases.

Trusteeship Council

1947 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-343
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
First Session

The last of the main organs of the United Nations to begin functioning, the Trusteeship Council met for its first session at Lake Success on March 26, 1947. Representatives were present from five powers administering trust territories (Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand and United Kingdom) and four non-administering states (China, Iraq, Mexico, and the United States); the USSR, although automatically a member of the Council by virtue of her permanent membership on the Security Council, did not designate a representative and took no part in the activities of the Council.

Voting in the Security Council and the PLO

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 470-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Gross
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Member State ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Palestine Liberation Organization ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Right

The United States and some other members of the United Nations have been concerned in recent years about the substance of some resolutions of the General Assembly and the procedures by which they were adopted. Their concern was intensified by certain actions at the twenty-ninth session, when the Assembly sustained a ruling of its President with respect to the representation and participation of South Africa in that and future sessions, when it curbed the right of Israel to participate in the debate on the question of Palestine, when it accorded to the representative of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) a treatment usually reserved to the head of a member state, and when it declared by Resolution 3210 (XXIX) of October 14, 1974, “that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine” and invited the PLO “to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.”

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document