scholarly journals Photon number splitting attack on the quantum key distribution protocol with six states

Author(s):  
Євген Вікторович Васіліу
Author(s):  
Carl F Sabottke ◽  
Chris D Richardson ◽  
Petr Anisimov ◽  
Ulvi Yurtsever ◽  
Antia Lamas-Linares ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 043003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl F Sabottke ◽  
Chris D Richardson ◽  
Petr M Anisimov ◽  
Ulvi Yurtsever ◽  
Antia Lamas-Linares ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 1750119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junaid ur Rehman ◽  
Saad Qaisar ◽  
Youngmin Jeong ◽  
Hyundong Shin

Quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes rely on the randomness to exchange secret keys between two parties. A control key to generate the same (pseudo)-randomness for the key exchanging parties increases the key exchange rate. However, the use of pseudo-randomness where true randomness is required makes a classical system vulnerable to the known plain-text attack. Contrary to the belief of unavailability of this attack in QKD, we show that this attack is actually possible whenever a control key is employed. In this paper, we show that it is possible to make use of the uncertainty principle to not only avoid this attack, but also remove the hazards of photon-number splitting attack in quantum setting. We define the secrecy of control key based on the guessing probability, and propose a scheme to achieve this defined secrecy. We show the general applicability of our framework on the most common QKD schemes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (07) ◽  
pp. 1950058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mehri Toonabi ◽  
Mahdi Davoudi Darareh ◽  
Shahrooz Janbaz

In this paper, we introduce a new quantum key distribution protocol, which we refer to as polarization-phase (PoP) protocol. In this protocol, two degrees of photonic freedom of the same particle in a hybrid manner are used to encode the information in the format of two- or high-dimensional quantum states (qubits and qudits, respectively). Here, we only discuss the qubit version of the general PoP protocol (we refer to two-dimensional PoP (TD-PoP) protocol) as an interesting extension for the standard BB84 protocol. We investigate the performance of the TD-PoP protocol using infinite-key analysis against restricted individual attacks, i.e. the intercept-resend and photon number splitting attacks, in both ideal single-photon and Poisson (attenuated laser) sources. In addition, we demonstrate that this protocol, despite using two physical dimensions, is simple and fully has empirical implementation capability. Ability to extract two bits of information from each detection event, and increasing the sifting parameter, the secure key rate, and the likelihood of detection of an eavesdropper, are the advantages of the TD-PoP protocol compared to the standard polarization- or phase-encoded BB84 protocol.


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