The security analysis of the BB84 protocol in the case of Calderbank–Shor–Steane code leakage

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows authenticated parties to share secure keys. Its security comes from quantum physics rather than computational complexity. The previous work has been able to demonstrate the security of the BB84 protocol based on the uncertainty principle, entanglement purification and information theory. In the security proof method based on entanglement purification, it is assumed that the information of Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) error correction code cannot be leaked, otherwise, it is insecure. However, there is no quantitative analysis of the relationship between the parameter of CSS code and the amount of information leaked. In the attack and defense strategy of the actual quantum key distribution system, especially in the application of the device that is easy to lose or out of control, it is necessary to assess the impact of the parameter leakage. In this paper, we derive the relationship between the leaked parameter of CSS code and the amount of the final key leakage based on the BB84 protocol. Based on this formula, we simulated the impact of different CSS code parameter leaks on the final key amount. Through the analysis of simulation results, the security of the BB84 protocol is inversely proportional to the value of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] in the case of the CSS code leak.

QKD key generation control protocol

Polarization-encoding fiber QKD requires compensation of polarization distortion caused by birefringence in optical fiber. Solving this task inevitably requires losing some effectiveness in terms of the final key rate. In this work, a time-division multiplexing protocol for polarisation calibration is suggested. This protocol was implemented in a QRate commercial QKD fiber system, utilizing BB84-protocol. Parameters of the protocol were optimized to maximize the secret key rate.