Theory of mind' : Conceptual framework and developmental process of young children with typical development

This chapter focuses on children’s ability to separate the imagined from the real and does so through a focus on imaginary companions. Imaginary companions appear in many forms; they can have physical forms (a puppet friend), or they can be purely mental creations. Typically, imaginary companions have ideas, emotions, and desires separate from the child’s, and thus they are saturated in theory-of-mind understandings. Although some authorities and many parents worry that imaginary companions are a particularly good example of children’s inability to separate the imagined from the real, research shows that young children easily distinguish between fantasy and fact, between the mental and the real, between imagined entities and real physical ones. Moreover, children who have imaginary companions not only distinguish between mind and reality, but also show numerous theory-of-mind strengths.

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Whose Children Are We Talking About?

Emerging Minds ◽

10.1093/oso/9780195077872.003.0004 ◽

1996 ◽

Author(s):

Robert S. Siegler

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Young Children ◽

Fourth Graders ◽

Third Graders ◽

Older Children ◽

Third Way ◽

Class Inclusion ◽

Living Things ◽

Developmental Theories ◽

Concrete Operational

My children have never looked much like those described in most theories of cognitive development. I don’t mean that they are generally deviant or that they perform abnormally on conservation or class inclusion tasks. They generally seem more or less normal, and on the few occasions when I have presented tasks from the cognitive developmental literature, they have acted pretty much like the children described in the articles. Where my children are altogether different from the theoretical descriptions is in the variability of their thinking. Cognitive developmental theories generally depict age and thought as proceeding in a 1:1 relation. At an early age, children think in one way; at a later age, they think in another way; at a still later age, they think in a third way. Such descriptions are so pervasive that they begin to feel like reality. Young children are said to form thematic concepts; somewhat older ones to form chain concepts; yet older ones to form true concepts. The reasoning of young children is said to be preoperational; that of somewhat older ones concrete operational; that of yet older ones formal operational. Young children are said to have one theory of mind; somewhat older ones a different, more inclusive theory; yet older ones a more advanced theory still. The story is the same with characterizations of performance on specific tasks. In descriptions of the development of the concept of living things, 3- and 4-yearolds are said to think that anything that moves is alive, 5- to 8-year-olds that animals—and only animals—are alive, and older children that plants as well as animals are alive. In descriptions of the development of addition skill, kindergartners are said to count from one; first through third graders to count from the larger addend; fourth graders and older children to retrieve answers from memory. In descriptions of the development of serial recall strategies, 5-year-olds are said not to rehearse; 8-year-olds to rehearse in a simple way; 11-year-olds to rehearse in a more elaborate way. My children’s thinking has never looked as neat and clean as these 1:1 characterizations of the relation between age and thought.

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