scholarly journals The Effects of the Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19, C- 397/19.The Obligation of the Decisions of the Romanian Constitutional Court and the Supremacy of EU

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Razvan Viorescu
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
International Institution ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Application Systems ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Grand Chamber

The supremacy of the Constitution is therefore compatible with the application systems that give application preference to regulations from legislation other than national law, as long as the Constitution itself established this provision, which happens exactly with the provision provided in art. 93, which allows the transfer of powers resulting from the Constitution in favor of an international institution thus constitutionally empowered to regulate matters previously reserved for domestic powers and their application.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The case of Konrad Erzberger v TUI AG. Comment to Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 July 2017, Case C-566/15

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Seifert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Parent Company ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the workers employed in the establishments of a group located in the territory of that Member State are deprived of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections of workers’ representatives to the supervisory board of the parent company of that group, which is established in that Member State, and as the case may be, of the right to act or to continue to act as representative on that board, where those workers leave their employment in such an establishment and are employed by a subsidiary belonging to the same group established in another Member State.

Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe's Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Past ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Bundestag

In the environment of ongoing endeavors to “rescue” the Euro, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is meanwhile dealing with several constitutional complaints challenging matters that could be described as “the future of the German Bundesbank” and “the present and the past of the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag.” Or, to be more specific, the complainants currently challenge the prospective participation of the German Bundesbank in possible future implementations of the so called “OMT Framework” of 6 September 2012. They also argue that the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag “failed to act” regarding this OMT framework.

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