The effects of organizational politics perception on turnover intention of local government officials -mediation effect of organizational silence and moderation effect of self-efficacy-

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
YunHee Jin
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Turnover Intention ◽  
Self Efficacy ◽  
Organizational Politics ◽  
Mediation Effect ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Moderation Effect ◽  
Organizational Silence ◽  
Local Government Officials

Community Development in Nigeria: Prevailing Orientations Among Local Government Officials

1990 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Hay ◽  
Peter H. Koehn ◽  
Eftychia F. Koehn
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Community Development ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

scholarly journals Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Yang ◽  
Weixin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

During China’s air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents’ behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

The Effects of Job Stress in Local Government Officials on Temporomandibular Disorders and Xerostomia

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
In-Young Ku ◽  
◽  
Hwa-Young Choi ◽  
Min-Kyoung Park ◽  
Kyung-Hwan Ka ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Job Stress ◽  
Temporomandibular Disorders ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document