scholarly journals McDowell y el realismo ingenuo. Mind and World ante el argumento por la ilusión

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (28) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Manuel Saharrea
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell

El artículo reconstruye mediante el análisis conceptual algunos aspectos de Mind and World de John McDowell, orientados a ampliar el rol explicativo de la tesis de la “carencia de límites de lo conceptual”. Para esto se vincula dicha tesis (que corre el riesgo de ser objeto de la objeción de idealismo en sus variantes “más perniciosas”) con la idea de percepción como “apertura al mundo” (que niega decididamente un idealismo semejante). Si bien la defensa del rol justificatorio del contenido perceptivo da cuenta de esta última tesis, no muestra relaciones posibles con la primera (al menos explícitamente). Este artículo, en cambio, propone resolver esta tensión. Así reconstruye la posible respuesta del conceptualismo de McDowell al argumento por la ilusión. De este modo, a partir de la distinción entre posibilidad ordinaria de error perceptual y posibilidad en principio (de error perceptual) –derivada del tratamiento de McDowell sobre la incorregibilidad perceptual– se concluye que la “carencia de límites de lo conceptual” y la afirmación de que ordinariamente la percepción nos proporciona conocimiento directo de hechos del mundo, no son incompatibles desde la perspectiva de la posibilidad ordinaria.

Reply to Guy Longworth

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Half Century ◽  
The Law

Starting in about 2004 John McDowell and I have engaged in a debate. There have been a number of public exchanges, and quite a few more private ones. In my view, some progress has been made (though the debate continues). Others may disagree (the ‘law of diminishing fleas’). I, at any rate, think I have learned from him. Guy Longworth does us both the honour of comparing our debate to one a half century earlier between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Honours apart, I think he has pointed to an illuminating connection between what I have long thought the main issue and another. If I had been asked what question McDowell and I had been (most centrally) debating, I would have said: it is the question how enjoying an experience of perceiving (e.g., of seeing) can make judging one thing or another intelligibly rational (that last term lifted from McDowell). I have a story to tell which is, in one key respect, sparser than his. To telegraph, he thinks such experience must have (representational) content. I think, not just that it needn’t, but that if it did, we would be cut off from ...

Reply to Nat Hansen

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell

Hansen is certainly right that the aim of my ‘Travis examples’ is, not to explain anything, but rather to point to a phenomenon. Or perhaps I would not now say so much as that. Over the course of my career I have been very deeply influenced by John McDowell. The main lesson I have taken from him is that the most important ‘result’ in philosophy—one of its most important tasks—is showing (to borrow a bit of McDowellian terminology) how it is ...

Are the Colours of Things Secondary Qualities?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
General Notion ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Independent Reality ◽  
Metaphysical Status

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.

"Taking in the world". L'ereditŕ kantiana in John McDowell

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
Anselmo Aportone
Keyword(s):  
Final Part ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
The World

McDowell carries on the dialogue with Kant opened by Sellars and Strawson. He is particularly interested in Kant's idea of intuition as an impression that is already an actualization of the conceptual capacities exercised by the knowing subject in judging. It enables him to release the contemporary discussion on intentionality from the stalemate between bald naturalism and coherentism. Because of the issues raised by both philosophers and some features of their arguments, it is undoubted that Mc- Dowell belongs to the Kantian heritage and exploits some of its elements. The final part of the essay aims at showing that these have in their original context a stronger und more definite meaning than in McDowell's proposal, and that it could be what we are in need of to make the latter more accurate.

scholarly journals A ansiada aparência do real: Sobre a não anulável pretensão de objetividade da experiência na epistemologia de McDowell

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-69
Author(s):  
Reynner Franco
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell

A epistemologia disjuntivista de John McDowell oferece uma resposta ao ceticismo sobre o conhecimento perceptual do mundo a partir de um argumento a favor da não anulável pretensão de objetividade da experiência. Proposta que resulta plausível desde o ponto de vista epistemológico. Adicionalmente, McDowell insiste na necessidade de incorporar um argumento transcendental (depurado do idealismo) ara refutar definitivamente dito ceticismo. Paul Snowdon tem esclarecido o alcance desta ponderação – e do disjuntivismo em geral –e tem formulado as perguntas oportunas acerca dos pressupostos e compromissos empírico-teoréticos de McDowell, cuja relação com seu enfoque epistemológico não resta de todo clara. Este artigo parte das perguntas de Snowdon, procurando mostrar que um dos principais pressupostos do ‘ponto de vista transcendental’ pretendida por McDowell, repousa em sua recepção de uma ‘radicalização’ do transcendentalismo kantiano, tal como se coloca no conceito hegeliano de ‘objetividade’. Se defende a observação de Snowdon de que o recurso (transcendental) de McDowell não parece fortalecer o alcance de sua teoria disjuntivista do conhecimento perceptual.

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