Risk Communication in the Food Field

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (sp) ◽  
pp. 598-602
Author(s):  
Hideaki Karaki ◽  

The first BSE case in Japan was found in 2001. The BSE risk in Japan was small and the measures taken by the government successfully prevented the spread of BSE. However, because consumers did not have accurate information, they did not trust the government and refused to consume beef. Based on the lessons learned, the government enacted the Food Safety Basic Act in 2003, and risk communication in the food field was started. In 2003, the first BSE case was found in the U.S. that were supplying nearly one third of the beef consumed in Japan, and the government banned beef import from the U.S. The BSE risk in the U.S. was also small and it was possible to resume imports of beef after the appropriate measures. Despite the government efforts of risk communication, consumers rejected the resumption of imports. In 2011, food was contaminated with radioactive substances discharged from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Although government eliminated the contaminated food from the market, some consumers rejected all of the agricultural products of the Fukushima region, again a failure of risk communication. Here, the current situation and problems of the risk communication in Japan will be described.

2021 ◽  
pp. 014664532110153
Author(s):  
Hajimu Yamana

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. This article describes the institutional structure established for decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. To deal with the aftermath of the unprecedented nuclear accident in Fukushima, several responsible institutions such as Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) have worked together at the initiative of the Government of Japan. In this structure, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) implements the decommissioning due to its legal responsibility, while the essential direction and milestones are set by the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the Government of Japan. Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation, a government-affiliated organisation, oversees and facilitates the decommissioning by TEPCO, and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority regulates safety from an independent standpoint. The main basic elements essential for the success of this long-term project have been developed, such as the technical strategy, financial system, and organisational capability. Decommissioning is making progress.


Author(s):  
Tadashi Narabayashi

On March 11, 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was hit by a tsunami caused by the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake, resulting in nuclear accidents in Units #1 to #4. With the aim of improving the safety of NPPs worldwide, we summarize the lessons that have been learned following a thorough analysis of the event and make specific proposals for improving the safety of such facilities. The author has been involved in investigating the causes of the accidents and developing countermeasures for other NPPs in Japan as a member of the Committee for the Investigation of Nuclear Safety of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan [1], an advisory meeting member of NISA with regard to technical lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accidents, and a Safety Evaluation Member of NISA for the other NPPs in Japan [2].


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (9) ◽  
pp. 782-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koichi Tanigawa ◽  
Yoshio Hosoi ◽  
Shuichi Terasawa ◽  
Hisayoshi Kondo ◽  
Yasushi Asari ◽  
...  

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