The Influence of Third-party E-Commerce Platform Price Limits on the Dual-Channel Strategy of Manufacturers

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
Huifang Yang ◽  
Deli Yang
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Price Limits ◽  
Pricing Models ◽  
Partial Loss ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
And Performance

Abstract Powerful platform operators always set price limits for sellers on the platform. This paper establishes Stackelberg game models according to two pricing models when the manufacturer enters the third-party e-commerce platform and sells products online. The first is a seller-pricing model in which the manufacturer decides the online price. The second is a platform-pricing model in which the platform decides the online price. We obtain the equilibrium results for these two models and the condition that allows the manufacturer to adopt the dual-channel strategy by comparing the operation decisions and performance of supply-chain members in the two models. Results show that the dual-channel strategy of the manufacturer always decreases the profit of the traditional retailer. In comparison with the seller-pricing model, the platform-pricing model always erodes parts of the manufacturers profit obtained by the dual-channel strategy. The manufacturer will pass on the partial loss to the retailer using relative leadership in the platform-pricing model, which renders the profit of the retailer lower than that in the seller-pricing model. Also, price limits do not always bring the platform more profits; sometimes the platform is forced to set a low price.

scholarly journals Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

scholarly journals The Optimal Pricing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with the Third Party Product Recovery and Sales Effort

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Limin Wang ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Recovery ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Model

The optimal pricing of dual-channel supply chain with the third party product recovery and sales effort is considered in this paper. The optimal selling pricing of direct channel and retail channel in the forward supply chain and the optimal collection pricing of retail channel and the third party in the backward supply chain are given for the general case under the centralized and decentralized model. Then, the effect of sales effort of the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy with sales effort under the centralized and decentralized model are provided and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis of four situations is carried out by numerical results.

scholarly journals Research on Pricing and Service Level Strategies of Dual Channel Reverse Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference in Multi-Regional Situations

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (23) ◽  
pp. 9143
Author(s):  
Yao Kang ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Di Wu
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Transfer Prices ◽  
High Level

Facing the increasingly serious waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling problem, recycling enterprises actively introduce online recycling channels, build dual channel reverse supply chains (DRSC), and use high-level recycling price and service levels to enhance consumers’ recycling enthusiasm and recycling amount. Nevertheless, in China, where the imbalance of regional development is widespread, the recycling center, third-party recycler (TPR), and third-party platform (TPP) are faced with the choices of pricing and service level when facing multi-regional consumers. This paper mainly answers the following questions: (1) When the recycling center and TPP introduce online recycling channels in multi-regional situations, how should they set online recycling price, transfer price, and service level? (2) When consumer preference for online channels changes in a certain region, how should recycling enterprises adjust their optimal pricing and service level decisions for different regions to maximize their own profits? How do the profits of recycling enterprises change? In order to solve the above problems, in this paper, we propose three pricing and service level decision models for the recycling center with online channels, namely, keeping prices unchanged, unifying all prices, and maximizing its own profits. By using the Stackelberg game to solve the model, we get the optimal pricing, service level decisions, as well as the maximum profits of the recycling center, TPP, and TPR when consumer preference changes. By analyzing the results of the model, we find that the change of consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will affect the decision and profits of multi-regional recycling enterprises. Specifically, consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will not only lead to an increase in the profits of the recycling center and TPP and a decrease in the profit of local TPRs, but also an increase in the profit of TPRs in other regions. In addition, at the beginning of introducing online channels, the recycling center can adopt two strategies to avoid conflicts among channels: keeping offline transfer prices unchanged and unifying all transfer prices, but the former promotes its economic profits more significantly.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamic Pricing and Service Decisions in the Reverse Supply Chain considering Consumers’ Service Sensitivity

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9348
Author(s):  
Jixiang Zhang ◽  
Chen Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Adjustment Parameter

In this work, considering consumers’ service sensitivity for the third-party collector in the reverse supply chain, a game model (including a manufacturer and a third-party collector) with dual-channel recycling structure was established. Based on the bounded rationality, we used dynamics theory to analyze the dynamic service and pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the third-party collector in the process of collecting waste products. The results showed that adjustment speeds of pricing and service decisions have great effect on the stability of recycling market, and the recycling market is most sensitive to the change of third-party collectors’ service decision. When the recycling market is in chaos, it has a strong initial value sensitivity. In addition, we found that increase of consumers’ service sensitivity and service cost parameter had negative effect on stability of the recycling market; there is a reverse relationship between price adjustment parameters and the service adjustment parameter. With the increase of service adjustment parameter, the bifurcation point of the system will appear more quickly. Finally, chaotic market can be controlled by the feedback control method.

Game Models of Green Supply Chain Involved the Third Party Logistics

2014 ◽  
Vol 700 ◽  
pp. 727-733
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party Logistics ◽  
Product Price ◽  
The Third Party Logistics ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

The green supply chain consisting of the third party logistics and retailer is as the background.Some factors are considered such as product green degree, carbon tax and consumer preferences. Two kinds of green supply chain game models are set up: Stackelberg game model dominated by the third party logistics,Stackelberg game model dominated by retailer. The game models are compared, and finally the numerical simulation has been carried on.Study shows that in the game models, with the improvement of product green degree, product price, logistics price, profit of the third party logistics, the profits of retailer and the supply chain will increase;With the increase of carbon tax, product price and logistics price also unceasingly increase.

scholarly journals Comparison of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Structures: E-Commerce Platform as Different Roles

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
De-li Yang ◽  
Zhao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

E-commerce platforms can act as an e-tailer or a third-party intermediary that charge a commission and allow manufacturers to sell products on their platform directly. These two forms of dual-channel supply chain structures have different impacts on decisions and profits of manufacturers and traditional retailers. This paper establishes different Stackelberg game models for both dual-channel supply chain structures and achieves the equilibrium results. The results state that both structures can increase the consumer surplus and social welfare. More importantly, when the platform acts as an e-tailer, the manufacturer and the traditional retailer can form a “win-win” situation. Nevertheless, when the platform acts as a third-party intermediary allowing manufacturers to sell products on the platform directly, it is bound to harm the interests of the traditional retailer.

scholarly journals Optimal Alliance Strategy and Its Impact in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain by considering Greenness and Service Effort

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Operation Efficiency ◽  
The Third

This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.

Resolving tension from the third-party forgiveness effect

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn M. Moloney ◽  
Chelsea A. Reid ◽  
Jody L. Davis ◽  
Jeni L. Burnette ◽  
Jeffrey D. Green
Keyword(s):  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party
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