scholarly journals Research on Pricing and Service Level Strategies of Dual Channel Reverse Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference in Multi-Regional Situations

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (23) ◽  
pp. 9143
Author(s):  
Yao Kang ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Di Wu
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Transfer Prices ◽  
High Level

Facing the increasingly serious waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling problem, recycling enterprises actively introduce online recycling channels, build dual channel reverse supply chains (DRSC), and use high-level recycling price and service levels to enhance consumers’ recycling enthusiasm and recycling amount. Nevertheless, in China, where the imbalance of regional development is widespread, the recycling center, third-party recycler (TPR), and third-party platform (TPP) are faced with the choices of pricing and service level when facing multi-regional consumers. This paper mainly answers the following questions: (1) When the recycling center and TPP introduce online recycling channels in multi-regional situations, how should they set online recycling price, transfer price, and service level? (2) When consumer preference for online channels changes in a certain region, how should recycling enterprises adjust their optimal pricing and service level decisions for different regions to maximize their own profits? How do the profits of recycling enterprises change? In order to solve the above problems, in this paper, we propose three pricing and service level decision models for the recycling center with online channels, namely, keeping prices unchanged, unifying all prices, and maximizing its own profits. By using the Stackelberg game to solve the model, we get the optimal pricing, service level decisions, as well as the maximum profits of the recycling center, TPP, and TPR when consumer preference changes. By analyzing the results of the model, we find that the change of consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will affect the decision and profits of multi-regional recycling enterprises. Specifically, consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will not only lead to an increase in the profits of the recycling center and TPP and a decrease in the profit of local TPRs, but also an increase in the profit of TPRs in other regions. In addition, at the beginning of introducing online channels, the recycling center can adopt two strategies to avoid conflicts among channels: keeping offline transfer prices unchanged and unifying all transfer prices, but the former promotes its economic profits more significantly.

scholarly journals A Multi-Echelon Network Design in a Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (9) ◽  
pp. 4760
Author(s):  
Peng Li ◽  
Di Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Network Design ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
Dual Channel

The rapid development of e-commerce technologies has encouraged collection centers to adopt online recycling channels in addition to their existing traditional (offline) recycling channels, such the idea of coexisting traditional and online recycling channels evolved a new concept of a dual-channel reverse supply chain (DRSC). The adoption of DRSC will make the system lose stability and fall into the trap of complexity. Further the consumer-related factors, such as consumer preference, service level, have also severely affected the system efficiency of DRSC. Therefore, it is necessary to help DRSCs to design their networks for maintaining competitiveness and profitability. This paper focuses on the issues of quantitative modelling for the network design of a general multi-echelon, dual-objective DRSC system. By incorporating consumer preference for the online recycling channel into the system, we investigate a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model to design the DRSC network with uncertainty and the model is solved using the ε-constraint method to derive optimal Pareto solutions. Numerical results show that there exist positive correlations between consumer preference and total collective quantity, online recycling price and the system profits. The proposed model and solution method could assist recyclers in pricing and service decisions to achieve a balance solution for economic and environmental sustainability.

scholarly journals The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
Recycling Networks ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Cost

The vigorous development of the new energy automobile industry has highlighted the issue of efficient recycling of power batteries. Using a Stackelberg game, the pricing mechanism of dual-channel power battery recycling models under different government subsidies is investigated. Consequently, sensitivity analysis and comparison analysis are conducted, providing the pricing decision and the optimal profit of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) systems. Finally, the effects of recycling efforts, power battery greenness levels, service levels, and consumer green recycling awareness on prices of power batteries and profits are determined through numerical simulations, and the optimal prices under different strategies are compared. The results indicate that recycling prices of each party in the manufacturer subsidy model are relatively high, and consumers’ green awareness and the green levels of power batteries are directly proportional to the recycling prices offered by recycling parties. Automobile 4S stores and recycling networks should pay attention to the balance between the increase in the cost and the quantity of government subsidies for their recycling efforts. For recycling enterprises, maintaining an appropriate service level can maximize their profits and positively motivate the development of them.

scholarly journals Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

The strategic design of port services based on a total landed cost approach

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa G. González-Ramírez ◽  
J. Rene Villalobos ◽  
Cesar Meneses
Keyword(s):  
Service Time ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Competitive Position ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Strategic Design ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Traffic Volumes ◽  
High Level

PurposeThis paper explores the effect of port's service time, particularly the mean and variability, on shippers' total landed costs to determine the competitive position of the port and derive recommendations for the strategic design of port services.Design/methodology/approachThe competitive position of a port is estimated considering the service level offered to the end-users of the port such as port service time, its variability and its effect on the total landed costs observed by the port users. The proposed methodology is meant to help ports to determine the required service time levels to maintain or gain a competitive advantage against other ports, in terms of attracting common hinterland's customers.FindingsResults show the advantages of considering service levels factors to determine the competitive position of a port, and what are the minimum characteristics required to capture more traffic volumes, that can help port managers to take strategic design decisions to better position the port in the current fierce market.Research limitations/implicationsThe proposed methodology is illustrated by considering a case study, which is the Port of Guaymas in Mexico. Data was not directly collected by the port, but based on interviews with shippers and public information, a representative case is presented. Due to a confidentiality agreement with the Port, specific references for most of the data used to estimate the model's parameters are not provided. The analysis is intended to show the potential value of this mechanism and can be used for evaluating the competitive position, from a high-level perspective, of any port to determine potential hinterland by improving the service level of the port.Originality/valueThe existing literature on port choice and port competition has not previously considered the effect of port service levels under the perspective of total landed costs of the users, being this paper a contribution to fulfill this gap.

scholarly journals Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 5429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Liu ◽  
Bisheng Du ◽  
Wenwen Yuan ◽  
Guiping Li
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Innovation Barriers ◽  
The Impact

Increasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system is discussed that includes an integrated manufacturer and a third-party collector. Then the impact of the integration with the innovation input into third-party product collectors is considered. Eventually, two models are constructed. The first model is a basic model that includes an integrated manufacturer and one third-party collector with innovation investment. The other model is the hybrid model that includes an integrated manufacturer and two third-party collectors with and without innovation input. Stackelberg game models are used to study the optimal pricing strategies for all three models and players’ attitudes toward different scenarios. Finally, numerical analysis is presented. Our findings are generated on the following three aspects. The collector’s recycling choice, recycling innovation input, and influence on recyclers and manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturer will always choose to recycle and prefers the hybrid recycling market, which depends on the rate of collection and the compensation from production-collecting. Moreover, the results reveal that the highest return rate of recyclers occurred under the hybrid model. However, the recyclers may not be able to invest the sustainable recycle innovation input under the exorbitant innovation barriers.

scholarly journals The Optimal Pricing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with the Third Party Product Recovery and Sales Effort

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Limin Wang ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Recovery ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Model

The optimal pricing of dual-channel supply chain with the third party product recovery and sales effort is considered in this paper. The optimal selling pricing of direct channel and retail channel in the forward supply chain and the optimal collection pricing of retail channel and the third party in the backward supply chain are given for the general case under the centralized and decentralized model. Then, the effect of sales effort of the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy with sales effort under the centralized and decentralized model are provided and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis of four situations is carried out by numerical results.

scholarly journals Optimal channel decision of retailers in the dual-channel supply chain considering consumer preference for delivery lead time

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-466
Author(s):  
Y.S. Hu ◽  
L.H. Zeng ◽  
Z.L. Huang ◽  
Q. Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Preference Coefficient

Facing competition from manufacturers' online direct channels, how retailers make sales channel decisions to increase consumer stickiness has become the core concern of the industry and academia. Empirical research showed that delivery lead time is a key factor that affects consumers' preference for online channels. To analyze the impact of consumer delivery time preference on channel selection and pricing strategy of retailers, consumer delivery lead time preference function was improved from a linear function to an exponential function and consumer demand under the mixed dual-channel supply chain of manufacturer and retailer was derived. Then, the Stackelberg game models under different channel strategies of retailer were established and solved. Results show that consumer preference for delivery lead time has four implications on the channel decision of retailers under manufacturer encroachment in the dual-channel supply chain. First, the dual retail channels strategy is the optimal choice for retailers, and the profit margins that a retailer obtains from dual retail channels supply chain and single online retail channel supply chain will increase as consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient increases. Second, the optimal pricing of online retail channel and offline retail channel is positively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. By contrast, the optimal pricing of online direct channel is negatively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. Third, the optimal pricing of online retail channel is higher than that of offline retail and online direct channels. Fourth, a retailer and a manufacturer can adopt a compensation-based whole price contract to address the conflict brought about by the optimal channel choice of the retailer. This study introduces consumer delivery lead time preference into retailer channel decision making and provides a theoretical reference for retailer's mixed channel construction in practice.

scholarly journals Dynamic Pricing Game in a Dual-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain with Heterogeneous Players and Delay Decision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Tao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Delay Decision

Abstract In this paper, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain(CLSC), where the manufacturer wholesales the new product through the traditional retail channel and distributes the remanufactured product via a direct channel established by himself. We focus on developing two dynamic Stackelberg game models under the assumption of the retailer is an adaptive agent and the manufacturer is a bounded rational player with non-delay and delay decisions. The existence and locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is investigated, and also the complex dynamics of each model is illustrated including period-doubling bifurcation, Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, strange attractor and chaotic phenomena. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine the impacts of key parameters on the complex behaviors of the long-run dynamic Stackelberg game and the performance of chain members under various scenarios. The results reveal that the excessively high value of the price adjustment speed of the manufacturer, the consumer discount perception for the remanufactured product as well as the consumer preference degree to the direct channel have adestabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium. Besides, the delay decision adopted by manufacturer no matter in the traditional or direct channel does not always necessarily make the system more stable, but the appropriately delay weights can expand the stability domain of the system. Moreover, the manufacturer would suffer a significant profit loss while the retailer can capture more profits when the dual-channel CLSC system falls into periodic cycles and chaos motions. At last, the variable feedback control method is utilized to eliminate the delayed system chaos.

The Influence of Third-party E-Commerce Platform Price Limits on the Dual-Channel Strategy of Manufacturers

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
Huifang Yang ◽  
Deli Yang
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Price Limits ◽  
Pricing Models ◽  
Partial Loss ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
And Performance

Abstract Powerful platform operators always set price limits for sellers on the platform. This paper establishes Stackelberg game models according to two pricing models when the manufacturer enters the third-party e-commerce platform and sells products online. The first is a seller-pricing model in which the manufacturer decides the online price. The second is a platform-pricing model in which the platform decides the online price. We obtain the equilibrium results for these two models and the condition that allows the manufacturer to adopt the dual-channel strategy by comparing the operation decisions and performance of supply-chain members in the two models. Results show that the dual-channel strategy of the manufacturer always decreases the profit of the traditional retailer. In comparison with the seller-pricing model, the platform-pricing model always erodes parts of the manufacturers profit obtained by the dual-channel strategy. The manufacturer will pass on the partial loss to the retailer using relative leadership in the platform-pricing model, which renders the profit of the retailer lower than that in the seller-pricing model. Also, price limits do not always bring the platform more profits; sometimes the platform is forced to set a low price.

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