Pre-emptive Integrated Well Control Risk Management

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew John Cuthbert ◽  
John Walters
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria de Lourdes Trevino ◽  
Manuel Alejandro Alvarado Rodríguez

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claas H. van der Zwaag ◽  
Thor Paulsen

Abstract The Snorre A blowout on well P-31 A on November 28, 2004, was a well control incident that sent percussions into our national and corporate HSE management systems. These percussions still resonate in our everyday work as a part of a comprehensive set of rules which encompass national regulations, industry standards, corporate functional, technical, or work requirements, as well as an integrated governing work process management system. Some of these rules have been embraced with a positive attitude and are now a natural part of our day-to-day work. They prepare for technical, organizational, and operational barriers that secure the safety of all personnel, shield the value of our investments and assets, and protect the environment. Some of these rules, however, may be perceived as dead weight and barriers in the sense of hindrances that may hamper an efficient workday and fill our agenda with many formal demands and obligations. This paper pinpoints and reviews "the change in rules" that the Snorre incident caused regarding planning, execution, and follow-up of drilling and well (D+W) operations on government, industry, and corporate level. The major failures that the investigations of the incident revealed have been handled diligently in our corporate system. In this paper, we track how management involvement, management of change, and "compliance and leadership" work in practice. The day-to-day tasks to prepare for safe D+W operations and to secure the integrity of wells in operations are explained. As an illustrative exercise, we are setting up a hypothetical plan for Snorre P-31 A as the D+W operations would have been planned today. This is done by outlining well barrier schematics, risk assessments, and the processes to handle deviations from technical or work requirements. Our objective is to explain that risk management in the planning and the execution of D+W operations and for wells in operations is coherent. To avoid the recurrence of incidents such as Snorre P-31 A, a systematic and rigorous approach is in use that makes it likely to capture inadequate well integrity conditions. This approach links high-end government regulations to sharp-end detailed operational risk management in our HSE management system.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjoern-Tore Anfinsen ◽  
Inge Mosti ◽  
Waldemar Szemat-Vielma

Abstract The use of automated workflows for engineering calculations is significantly improving the efficiency of modern well planning systems. Current automated well control solutions are at large limited to single bubble considerations. Transient, multiphase technology has proven to be more accurate and reliable for well control planning, but it has been too complex to automate and integrate into automated engineering systems. The objective of this work is to improve well control planning efficiency by using an automated workflow that enables integration of transient multiphase technology into modern well-planning systems. The workflow is based around an advanced multiphase engine that covers all relevant physical processes in the wellbore including transient temperature and acceleration. The model has an accurate equations-of-state- (EOS) based pressure-volume-temperature (PVT) model with compositional tracking that, in combination with the transient temperature, can accurately predict the transition from dissolved to free gas - a key parameter in the development of a kick. The workflow is based on Driller's method and has been automated with a controller network that moves the simulation through the distinct phases of the driller's first circulation without any interaction from the user. High-performance cloud computing ensures the workflow performance. The drilling industry has focused on risk reductions after the Deepwater Horizon (BSSE 2010) accident. But the well-control risk is still high. In Norway, the reported incidents indicate a flat or increasing trend. Geological uncertainties and inaccurate mud density (static and circulating) have been identified as root causes for the majority of the reported incidents. Transient multiphase models are reducing well-control risk by accurately modeling downhole variations in fluid pressure as a function of operational mode, fluids, influx type, geometry, water depth, and pressure and temperature conditions. Such models have been regarded as expert tools because of the complexity and numerically demanding simulations. The automated workflow enables a well control engineer to run accurate multiphase simulations with the same user effort as single bubble kick tolerance tools. In special cases where more sensitivities are required, it is easy to transfer the project to the expert mode - where the automated simulation can be finetuned.


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