A Duopoly Model of Pricing for Inventory Liquidation.

1987 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Mamer ◽  
Sushil Bikhchandani
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
A. Bërdëllima

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.


Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wu ◽  
Junhai Ma

Although oligopoly theory is generally concerned with the single-product firm, what is true in the real word is that most of the firms offer multiproducts rather than single products in order to obtain cost-saving advantages, cater for the diversity of consumer tastes, and provide a barrier to entry. We develop a dynamical multiproduct Cournot duopoly model in discrete time, where each firm has an owner who delegates the output decision to a manager. The principle of decision-making is bounded rational. And each firm has a nonlinear total cost function due to the multiproduct framework. The Cournot Nash equilibrium and the local stability are investigated. The tangential bifurcation and intermittent chaos are reported by numerical simulations. The results show that high output adjustment speed can lead to output fluctuations which are characterized by phases of low volatility with small output changes and phases of high volatility with large output changes. The intermittent route to chaos of Flip bifurcation and another intermittent route of Flip bifurcation which contains Hopf bifurcation can exist in the system. The study can improve our understanding of intermittent chaos frequently observed in oligopoly economy.


Systems ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Pavel Pražák ◽  
Jaroslav Kovárník

The economic world is very dynamic, and most phenomena appearing in this world are mutually interconnected. These connections may result in the emergence of nonlinear relationships among economic agents. Research discussions about different markets’ structures cannot be considered as finished yet. Even such a well-known concept as oligopoly can be described with different models applying diverse assumptions and using various values of parameters; for example, the Cournot duopoly game, Bertrand duopoly game or Stackelberg duopoly game can be and are used. These models usually assume linear functions and make analyses of the behavior of the two companies. The aim of this paper is to consider a nonlinear inverse demand function in the Cournot duopoly model. Supposing there is a sufficiently large proportion among the costs of the two companies, we can possibly detect nonlinear phenomena such as bifurcation of limit values of production or deterministic chaos. To prove a sensitive dependence on the initial condition, which accompanies deterministic chaos, the concept of Lyapunov exponents is used. We also point out the fact that even though some particular values of parameters are irrelevant for the above-mentioned nonlinear phenomena, it is worth being aware of their existence.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 865
Author(s):  
Vladimir Mazalov ◽  
Elena Konovalchikova

Equilibrium in a two-sided market represented by network platforms on the plane and heterogeneous agents is investigated. The advocated approach is based on the duopoly model which implies a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and examines the agents’ heterogeneous utility with the Hotelling specification. The exact values were found for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly in a two-sided market with two platforms on the plane. The dependence of the platforms’ benefits on network externalities was investigated. The problem of the optimal location of platforms in the market was considered.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manahan Siallagan ◽  
Hiroshi Deguchi ◽  
Manabu Ichikawa

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