scholarly journals Hotelling’s Duopoly in a Two-Sided Platform Market on the Plane

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 865
Author(s):  
Vladimir Mazalov ◽  
Elena Konovalchikova
Keyword(s):  
Heterogeneous Agents ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Optimal Location ◽  
Limited Size ◽  
Duopoly Model

Equilibrium in a two-sided market represented by network platforms on the plane and heterogeneous agents is investigated. The advocated approach is based on the duopoly model which implies a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and examines the agents’ heterogeneous utility with the Hotelling specification. The exact values were found for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly in a two-sided market with two platforms on the plane. The dependence of the platforms’ benefits on network externalities was investigated. The problem of the optimal location of platforms in the market was considered.

scholarly journals Video Platforms’ Value-Added Service Investments and Pricing Strategies for Advertisers

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 13701
Author(s):  
Gang Liu ◽  
Fengyue An
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Value Added Service ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
The Cost ◽  
S Model

Using a game-theoretical approach, this paper develops a duopoly model and examines value-added service (VAS) investments and pricing strategies on video platforms with opposite inter-group network externalities between two groups. We consider two scenarios with VAS investment, namely, a single platform investing in VASs for advertisers (S-Model) and both platforms investing in VASs for advertisers (B-Model). We found the following: (i) In the S-Model, the investing platform’s VAS level remains maximum when the marginal investing cost is low; otherwise, it decreases with the cost. Investing and non-investing platforms’ advertising prices are unaffected by the marginal investing cost if the cost is low; otherwise, the prices decrease and increase with the cost, respectively. Furthermore, the investing platform’s advertising price is higher than the non-investing platform’s. (ii) In the B-Model, the two platforms’ VAS levels remain maximum if the marginal investing cost is low; otherwise, they decrease with the cost. The two platforms’ advertising prices are equal and irrelevant to the marginal investing cost. (iii) The investing platform’s VAS level in the S-Model is higher than or the same as that in the B-Model and the investing platform’s advertising price in the S-Model is higher than that in the B-Model. (iv) Compared to the scenario without VAS investment, the investing platform’s advertising price is higher in the S-Model, but the same in the B-Model.

scholarly journals Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-98
Author(s):  
Zhenhua Feng ◽  
Таосин Лиу ◽  
Владимир Мазалов ◽  
Vladimir Mazalov ◽  
Jie Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Optimization Problem ◽  
Heterogeneous Agents ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Market Size ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Limited Size ◽  
Corner Solution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Market

We study a two-sided market represented by network platforms and heterogeneous agents. Our setup departs from Armstrong (2006)’s monopoly model by assuming both (1) a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and (2) heterogeneous utility of agents with Hotelling specification. We show that the monopoly’s optimal pricing strategy always results in a corner solution in terms of the equilibrium market share. We also solve for the social planner’s optimization problem and obtain a similar corner solution result. In addition, the exact values for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly for a two-sided market on two platforms are obtained.

Voltage Stability Enhancement with Optimal Placement of IPFC

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 9465-9471
Keyword(s):  
Transmission Line ◽  
Objective Function ◽  
Search Algorithm ◽  
Cuckoo Search ◽  
Test System ◽  
Optimal Location ◽  
Optimal Placement ◽  
Utilization Factor ◽  
Location Selection ◽  
Multi Objective

This paper presents a novel technique based on Cuckoo Search Algorithm (CSA) for enhancing the performance of multiline transmission network to reduce congestion in transmission line to huge level. Optimal location selection of IPFC is done using subtracting line utilization factor (SLUF) and CSA-based optimal tuning. The multi objective function consists of real power loss, security margin, bus voltage limit violation and capacity of installed IPFC. The multi objective function is tuned by CSA and the optimal location for minimizing transmission line congestion is obtained. The simulation is performed using MATLAB for IEEE 30-bus test system. The performance of CSA has been considered for various loading conditions. Results shows that the proposed CSA technique performs better by optimal location of IPFC while maintaining power system performance

A Duopoly Model of Pricing for Inventory Liquidation.

1987 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Mamer ◽  
Sushil Bikhchandani
Keyword(s):  
Duopoly Model
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document