The complex dynamics of a multi-product mixed duopoly model with partial privatization and cross-ownership

2015 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 1391-1401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wu ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Partial Privatization ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Cross Ownership

Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization

2011 ◽  
Vol 107 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ritika Jain ◽  
Rupayan Pal
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Partial Privatization ◽  
Cross Ownership

scholarly journals Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Strategic Trade Policy ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Strategic Trade ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Product Competition ◽  
Cross Ownership

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH AN R&D RIVALRY

2009 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Heywood ◽  
Guangliang Ye
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Partial Privatization

scholarly journals Complex Dynamics Analysis for a Cournot-Bertrand Mixed Game Model with Delayed Bounded Rationality

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Hongwu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Model ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Dynamic Properties ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Delayed System ◽  
Route To Chaos

A Cournot-Bertrand mixed duopoly game model is constructed. The existence and local stable region of the Nash equilibria point are investigated. Complex dynamic properties such as bifurcation and route to chaos are analyzed using parameter basin plots. The strange attractors are also studied when the system is in chaotic states. Furthermore, considering the memory of the market, a delayed Cournot-Bertrand mixed model is considered and the results show that the delayed system has the same Nash equilibrium and has a higher chance of reaching steady states or cycles than the model without delay. So making full use of the historical data can improve the system’s stability.

Privatization, Unemployment, and Welfare in the Harris-Todaro Model with a Mixed Duopoly

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi ◽  
Jun Yin
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Unemployment Rate ◽  
Relative Degree ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Partial Privatization ◽  
The Public ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Short Run

Abstract This paper explores the unemployment and welfare effects of privatization through the Harris-Todaro model with a mixed duopoly. Our approach is more generalized than the existing literature. When capital is sector-specific (i. e., it is in the short run), an increase in the degree of partial privatization will raise the unemployment rate, but the change of social welfare is conditional on the market share of the public firm and the relative degree of partial privatization. When capital is sector-mobile (i. e., it is in the long run), an increase in the degree of partial privatization will reduce the unemployment rate, but the change of social welfare is also dependent on the market share of the public firm and the relative degree of partial privatization. Our results capture the fact that the public firm and the private firm usually coexist in a competitive environment in the real world.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamics in a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Relative Profit Maximization

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Yuqi Dou ◽  
Xingyu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Systems ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Rational Expectation ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Discrete Dynamic Systems ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Relative Profit

In this paper, the complex dynamic behavior of a mixed duopoly game model is studied. Based on the principle of relative profit maximization and bounded rational expectation, the corresponding discrete dynamic systems are constructed in the case of nonlinear cost function. In theory, the conditions for the local stability of Nash equilibrium are given. In terms of numerical experiments, bifurcation diagrams are used to depict the effects of product differences, adjustment speed, and other parameters on the stability of Nash equilibrium.

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