scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality: Preliminary Evidence from Saudi Arabia

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-116
Author(s):  
Sarah Al-Khonain ◽  
Khalid Al-Adeem
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

The investment climate in the country depends largely on the level of confidence of potential investors, which actualizes the need to provide transparent and quality financial reporting to economic entities. Powerful corporations that have established an effective corporate governance mechanism are able to provide high competitive advantage over the long term, contributing to their financial and economic stability. The purpose of the article is to determine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of a company’s financial statements. The corporate governance rules in force in Saudi Arabia were developed in 2006, then revised twice in 2009 and 2015, and only finally approved in 2017. The survey was based on the results of an electronic survey of 56 Saudi financial analysts selected from their LinkedIn profiles (financial analysts were selected by respondents because they play a significant role in the capital markets and are users of financial statements). The author points out that the objectivity of the survey results can be enhanced by expanding the sample of survey participants. The questionnaire contained 11 questions about corporate governance and its contribution to improving the quality of the financial statements of the respective companies. The results of the survey have empirically confirmed that corporate governance is a factor contributing to improving the quality of financial reporting and, consequently, increasing foreign investment inflows, so compliance with the new corporate governance rules is extremely important for Saudi Arabia corporations. Improvements in corporate governance mechanisms are perceived by members of boards of directors, audit committees, and internal audit departments as one of the main factors in improving the quality of financial reporting. Keywords: corporate governance; Financial Statements; financial analysts; transparency of reporting; investors; Saudi Arabia.

Corporate governance and fraudulent financial reporting

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahab Rostami ◽  
Leyla Rezaei
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to trace the impact of corporate governance and its mechanisms in preventing companies from turning to fraudulent financial reporting. Design/methodology/approach For this purpose, using the systematic elimination pattern, the information of 187 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange over six years from 2013 to 2019 were collected, and the hypotheses were examined using a linear regression model. To measure fraudulent financial reporting, the adjusted model of Beneish (1999) was used to evaluate corporate governance. Its mechanisms based on nine corporate governance mechanisms, including board independence, board remuneration, CEO financial expertise, expertise in CEO industry, board financial expertise, board industry expertise, board effort, CEO duality and managerial ownership, have been examined. These mechanisms are calculated as a combined index of corporate governance. Findings The findings indicate that robust corporate governance significantly reduces companies’ intention toward fraudulent financial reporting. In the same way, a negative and significant relationship was observed between each of the nine corporate governance mechanisms, except for board compensation and fraudulent financial reporting. Originality/value This study’s findings provide valuable insight into the importance of strengthening companies to prevent companies’ managers from engaging in fraudulent financial reporting activities. Hence, it is suggested that professional references bodies more seriously follow the rules to dictate to companies for using and empowering their corporate governance.

Did corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management? Further evidence from GCC Islamic banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Chakib Kolsi ◽  
Rihab Grassa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provision ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management practice for a sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) using a new model of earnings management. Design/methodology/approach First, the authors estimate discretionary accruals based on loan loss provisions discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) using the procedure derived from Jones’ (1991) original model. Second, the authors run a multivariate regression model to check the linkage between corporate governance characteristics and discretionary loan loss provision. Finally, the authors use an additional sensitivity check analysis to assess whether the results are robust to the estimation procedure and to other exogenous factors. Findings Using as sample of 26 IBs pertaining to the GCC region with a total of 223 firm-year observations and a nine-year period (2004-2012), the results are conclusive and show that first, IBs with large Shariah Board size manage less DLLP. Secondly, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions membership positively impacts earnings management through DLLP in IBs. Third, there is a negative relationship between boards of director’s independence the extent to which IBs manage DLLP. Fourth, the existence of block holders positively affects earnings management by IBs. Fifth, there is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and DLLP. Finally, institutional ownership and bank size have no effect on earnings management through DLLPs. Research limitations/implications In this research, the authors do not take into account all governance factors that are supposed to impact earnings management in IBs. Future research should explore the impact of additional IBs governance structures including chief executive officer bonus, experience, gender and the extent to which IBs use real earnings management with Murabaha, Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions. Practical implications The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in helping the future development of corporate governance of IBs. In addition, the findings could prove to be useful for regulators because they are responsible for the acceptable level of corporate governance standards. Thus, they must consider strengthening governance mechanisms either through new legislation or stronger enforcement where earnings management is of such magnitude to that serious impedes information transparency and financial reporting quality of IBs. Originality/value This study associates the corporate governance characteristics with earnings management by IBs. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management and corporate governance in IBs. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of IBs’ accounting information in GCC countries.

scholarly journals Impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality: a study of Indian GAAP and Indian Accounting Standards

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Faozi A. Almaqtari ◽  
Abdulwahid Abdullah Hashed ◽  
Mohd Shamim ◽  
Waleed M. Al-ahdal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

The present study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality under Indian GAAP and Indian Accounting Standards (Ind. AS). A sample of 97 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange is selected. Corporate governance mechanisms have been considered as independent variables, and financial reporting quality is the dependent variable. Corporate governance is measured by board effectiveness (board size, independence, diligence, and expertise), audit committee attributes (size, independence, diligence, and expertise), foreign ownership, and audit quality. Descriptive statistics, correlation, and OLS regression are conducted to estimate the results. The study results reveal that board characteristics and audit committee attributes, except for audit committee diligence, have a significant effect on financial reporting quality. However, the impact of board diligence and audit committee attributes is negative. Foreign ownership has no contribution to financial reporting quality, but audit quality has a significant effect. The findings of the study have considerable implications for regulators, policymakers, managers, investors, analysts, and academicians. More emphasis should be given to compliance with Ind. AS, and an oversight body for compliance with Ind. AS should be established. AcknowledgmentThis publication was supported by Deanship of Scientific Research, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University, Alkharj, Saudi Arabia.

scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting transparency

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samin Kohansal ◽  
Shoeyb Rostami ◽  
Zeynab Rostami
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Management Behavior ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Corporate governance has been raised as one of the most important issues among the international business environment since the beginning of the twenty-first century. At first, corporate governance basic principles focused on firm’s strategies and the rights of their shareholders but these principles has been changed into the rights of all stakeholders and society through researchers new viewpoints. Although corporate governance codes and regulations are different in various countries, there is a common unanimity that better compliance of corporate governance improves financial reporting quality and transparency. The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting transparency in Tehran Stock Exchange over a seven year period (from 2006 to 2012). Besides we have specially reviewed related researches and topics about corporate governance in various countries which their results were discussed in different parts of the article. In order to examine the hypothesis a sample of 67 companies is used. In this paper we used ownership concentration, institutional ownership, board independence, board size, CEO duality and CEO tenure as the corporate governance mechanisms. We also used earnings management behavior by employing Kasznik model (the absolute value of abnormal accruals) as a measure of financial reporting transparency. To test research hypothesis a multiple regression with estimated generalized least square method is employed. The findings indicate that ownership concentration, institutional ownership, board independence and CEO tenure has positively affected financial reporting transparency through earnings management behavior. On the other hand board size and CEO duality has negatively affected financial reporting transparency through earnings management behavior.

Do manufacturing firms in Bangladesh engage in earnings management to avoid losses? Further evidence using the governance elements as monitors

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bishnu Kumar Adhikary ◽  
Ranjan Kumar Mitra ◽  
Mohammad Rajon Meah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Management Behavior ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to investigate the earnings management practices of the listed manufacturing firms in Bangladesh and assess the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on such earnings management behavior. Design/methodology/approach The study applies the real earnings management (REM) model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006) and modified Jones model (1991) for the proxy of accrual-based earnings management (AEM). It uses a pooled ordinary least square regression model corrected with robust standard errors for empirical analysis. Findings The study finds that firms with small positive earnings per share are engaged in AEM to avoid losses. Also, firm managers craft discretionary expenses to manage real earnings. For governance factors, the institutional shareholders tend to play a significant role in limiting both REM and AEM embedded in generally accepted accounting principles or International Financial Reporting Standards. Also, factors such as foreign ownership and board size significantly restrict REM, whereas director ownership encourages the same. The paper does not reveal any significant monitoring role for other governance factors in curbing either REM or AEM practices by Bangladeshi firms. Research limitations/implications The paper studies the monitoring role of governance mechanisms on listed manufacturing firms’ earnings management. A study of separating the listed firms into family and non-family ones could be interesting for future research. Practical implications The paper unveils earning management techniques used by firms in Bangladesh and provides critical policy implications to the corporate governance mechanisms that effectively limit earnings management practice. Social implications The social significance is to aware constituents of financial reporting about the earnings management behavior by firms in emerging economies. Originality/value The study adds to evidence that the manufacturing firms in Bangladesh adopt both REM and AEM techniques to avoid losses. Simultaneously, the paper highlights some critical governance factors that can restrict misleading earnings management behavior by firms in an emerging economy to assist in policymaking.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and risk disclosure quality: Tunisian evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Issal Haj Salem ◽  
Salma Damak Ayadi ◽  
Khaled Hussainey
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Risk Disclosure ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential influence of corporate governance mechanisms on risk disclosure quality in Tunisia. Design/methodology/approach The authors examine 152 annual reports of Tunisian non-financial-listed firms during 2008–2013, and use the manual content analysis method to measure the risk disclosure quality. Findings The authors find that the quality of risk disclosure in Tunisian companies is relatively low, and also find that the quality of risk disclosure is positively associated with institutional ownership, board independence, the presence of women on the board, the presence of family members on the board and the independence of audit committee. Managerial ownership has a negative effect on risk disclosure quality. Finally, the authors find that the revolution decreases the influence of concentration ownership, government ownership, family ownership and audit committee size on risk disclosure quality. Originality/value Using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms and a new measure for risk disclosure quality in Tunisia, the authors provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on risk disclosure quality in a developing country. The study has theoretical and practical implications for both developed and developing countries.

The impact of board independency, CEO duality and CEO fixed compensation on M&A performance

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 947-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Teti ◽  
Alberto Dell’Acqua ◽  
Leonardo Etro ◽  
Michele Volpe
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to examine whether particular corporate governance mechanisms influence the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Design/methodology/approach Regression analyses investigating 1,596 recent acquisitions in the US market completed over the five-year period from 2009 to 2013 are performed. Findings The results show that board independency, CEO duality and level of CEO fixed compensation have an impact on the return of acquisitions. Moreover, the findings indicate that acquisitions significantly create value for bidders delivering a positive cumulative abnormal return upon announcement. Finally, also focusing on the 690 relative larger deals, there is a clear evidence of a positive influence of good corporate governance mechanisms over the quality of acquisitions completed. Originality/value To our knowledge, this is the first paper trying to identify corporate governance mechanisms related to the best acquisition decisions, by using specifically the three corporate governance variables (CEO duality, CEO fixed compensation and board independency).

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