Confucian Criticisms of Catholicism

Author(s):  
Don Baker ◽  
Franklin Rausch

This chapter focuses on the Neo-Confucian moral and philosophical foundations for rejecting Catholic beliefs and values as idan, meaning unacceptable. It argues that, in mainstream Neo-Confucian eyes, Catholicism was unacceptable because it was not Chinese and it promoted beliefs that appear to Confucians to be unreasonable. But, more important, Catholicism appeared to focus on such selfish concerns as individual salvation rather than the common good and therefore it was, by Confucian criterion, immoral.

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-416
Author(s):  
Crystal Filep ◽  
Michelle Thompson-Fawcett

Contextual relativities in the diversifying expression of New Urbanism are increasingly important. In this article, we explore the significance of context using a Scandinavian setting as example. We examine two embodiments of the Swedish realisation of New Urban neighbourhoods. Important in our exploration are the relationalities with contemporary contexts and belief systems, since every effort to create space becomes “an elaboration of the beliefs and values of some collection of people, expressed and fostered in their promotion of a preferred reality” (Stokowski, 2002, p. 374). The findings from the study demonstrate that the Swedish New Urban neighbourhood—no matter how meaningful as a communicative form mediating between agents and structures—cannot effect social cohesion or isolation. Rather, form communicates or evokes meaning in a variety of complex ways, suggesting the importance of “look[ing] to multiply…our readings of the city” (Leach, 1997, p. 158), particularly high<em>-</em>level readings that echo notions of the common good. Those concerned with New Urbanism’s embodiments should deliberate on relational fluidities and thereby strike a balance between conceptualising such urban design as either deterministically exceeding its power (Lawhon, 2009) or as side-lined to the whimsical relativity of particular consumers (Latham, 2003; Smith, 2002).


Author(s):  
Alex John London

The foundations of research ethics are riven with fault lines emanating from a fear that if research is too closely connected to weighty social purposes an imperative to advance the common good through research will justify abrogating the rights and welfare of study participants. The result is an impoverished conception of the nature of research, an incomplete focus on actors who bear important moral responsibilities, and a system of ethics and oversight highly attuned to the dangers of research but largely silent about threats of ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable medical practices and health systems. In For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics, Alex John London defends a conception of the common good that grounds a moral imperative with two requirements. The first is to promote research that generates the information necessary to enable key social institutions to effectively, efficiently, and equitably safeguard the basic interests of individuals. The second is to ensure that research is organized as a voluntary scheme of social cooperation that respects its various contributors’ moral claims to be treated as free and equal. Connecting research to the goals of a just social order grounds a framework for assessing and managing research risk that reconciles these requirements and justifies key oversight practices in non-paternalistic terms. Reconceiving research ethics as resolving coordination problems and providing credible assurance that these requirements are being met expands the issues and actors that fall within the purview of the field and provides the foundation for a more unified and coherent approach to domestic and international research.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 110-127
Author(s):  
Abdoulaye Sounaye

Unexpectedly, one of the marking features of democratization in Niger has been the rise of a variety of Islamic discourses. They focus on the separation between religion and the state and, more precisely, the way it is manifested through the French model of laïcité, which democratization has adopted in Niger. For many Muslim actors, laïcité amounts to a marginalization of Islamic values and a negation of Islam. This article present three voices: the Collaborators, the Moderates, and the Despisers. Each represents a trend that seeks to influence the state’s political and ideological makeup. Although the ulama in general remain critical vis-à-vis the state’s political and institutional transformation, not all of them reject the principle of the separation between religion and state. The Collaborators suggest cooperation between the religious authority and the political one, the Moderates insist on the necessity for governance to accommodate the people’s will and visions, and the Despisers reject the underpinning liberalism that voids religious authority and demand a total re-Islamization. I argue that what is at stake here is less the separation between state and religion than the modality of this separation and its impact on religious authority. The targets, tones, and justifications of the discourses I explore are evidence of the limitations of a democratization project grounded in laïcité. Thus in place of a secular democratization, they propose a conservative democracy based on Islam and its demands for the realization of the common good.


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