Equity Market Liberalizations and Corporate Governance*

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kee-Hong Bae ◽  
Vidhan K. Goyal ◽  
Angela Ng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Equity Market

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Finance, and the Real Sector

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1187-1214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Fulghieri ◽  
Matti Suominen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Real Sector ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
The Real ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Industry Equilibrium ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
Equity Market Liberalization

AbstractWe present a theory of the linkages between corporate governance, corporate finance, and the real sector of an economy. Using a structural model of industry equilibrium with endogenous entry, we show that poor corporate governance leads to low levels of competition, and to firms with high insider ownership and leverage. In contrast, good corporate governance promotes the adoption of more efficient technologies and development of sectors more exposed to moral hazard. We use our model to study equity market liberalization, and we show that liberalizations facilitate entry and adoption of more productive technologies, especially in countries with good corporate governance.

scholarly journals Equity Market Liberalization and Corporate Governance

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kee-Hong Bae ◽  
Vidhan K. Goyal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Market Liberalization ◽  
Equity Market Liberalization

scholarly journals Corporate governance and financial contracting: bondholder takeover defenses in poison puts

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-20
Author(s):  
Ai-Fen Cheng ◽  
Tao-Hsien Dolly King
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Market Performance ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Takeover Defenses ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Asset Sale

Bondholder governance through the use of bond covenants and the interactions between shareholder and bondholder governance mechanisms has been recently highlighted in the corporate governance literature. In this paper, we study bondholder governance mechanisms through takeover-related bond covenants (i.e., poison puts), confirm with agency theory on the characteristics of firms that are more likely to use these covenants, and emphasize the importance of bondholder governance in the overall structure of corporate governance. We find that poison puts are often bundled with asset sale, payout, and financing restrictions, which is consistent with agency theory. We also find that high growth firms, large, profitable, low-leverage firms are more likely to use poison puts. In addition, our results on free cash flow, insider and institutional ownership provide support for agency explanation. Lastly, we find that poor bond market performance and good equity market performance are likely to motivate the incidence of poison put bond issuance. Volatility of interest rate and volatility of bond index returns motivate more issues of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term and default premiums promote the use of poison puts.

scholarly journals THE MODERATING ROLE OF FIRM SIZE ON FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ISLAMIC FIRM VALUE AT INDONESIAN EQUITY MARKET

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 391-401
Author(s):  
Perdana Wahyu Santosa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Characteristics ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Moderating Role

This study aims to understand the moderating role of firm size on financial characteristics and Islamic firm value. Then study how the influence of firm size moderation on the relationship of financial characteristics and corporate governance with firm value. This study uses secondary data from financial statements and analyzed by the panel data method for six years. The sample selection is arranged by the purposive sampling method with Islamic index constituent population. Conclusion: leverage, profitability, and efficiency have a significant positive effect on Islamic firm value, but the liquidity and audit committee do not affect. Firm size moderators provide a reinforcing effect for all independent variables so that liquidity and audit committees have a positive effect on firm value. Implications: Islamic firm investors in the equity market should consider the crucial variable, namely firm size, in addition to firm and corporate governance characteristics. These conclusions provide important implications for managers and relevant authorities to enhance financial market information related to firm value and further attention to corporate governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals Equity market liberalization and corporate governance

2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 609-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kee-Hong Bae ◽  
Vidhan K. Goyal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Market Liberalization ◽  
Equity Market Liberalization

scholarly journals Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate governance, and strategic dividend decisions

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-124
Author(s):  
Mark Bertus ◽  
John S. Jahera Jr. ◽  
Keven Yost
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Significant Relation ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relation between measures of corporate governance and a firm’s dividend policy in the U.S. equity market. Using the IRRC database, we find that there is a statistically significant relation between governance measures and a firm’s dividend policy in the years prior to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, following Sarbanes-Oxley, the relation between a firm’s governance structure and dividend policy changes. In particular, shareholders’ rights and the proportion of outside directors are no longer significant in explaining a firm’s dividend policy.

The Evolution of Corporate Governance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bob Tricker
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance
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