The Federal Home Loan Banks and Commercial Bank Risk Taking: An Overstated Moral Hazard?

Author(s):  
Jonathan A. Scott ◽  
Scott E. Hein

Author(s):  
Mehdi Mili ◽  
Sami Abid

Purpose This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk. Findings The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking. Originality/value This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.





2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-136
Author(s):  
NGUYEN THANH LIEM ◽  
TRAN HUNG SON ◽  
HOANG TRUNG NGHIA


Author(s):  
Lai Van Vo ◽  
Huong Thi Thu Le




Author(s):  
Sjoerd van Bekkum ◽  
Marc Gabarro ◽  
Rustom M. Irani
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Matthew Baugh ◽  
Matthew Ege ◽  
Christopher G. Yust

Using a sample of bank-years from 2005 to 2017, we examine the effect of internal control quality on future risk-taking and performance. We find that banks that disclose a material weakness in internal controls have higher risk-taking and worse performance in the future, including having a higher (lower) likelihood of experiencing large losses (gains). These findings suggest that weak controls increase (reduce) downside (upside) risk-taking or conversely that strong controls increase (reduce) upside (downside) risk-taking. Path analyses suggest that 22.3 to 43.7 percent of the effect of internal control quality on future performance is through risk-taking. Additionally, material weaknesses are negatively associated with total asset, loan, interest income, and non-interest income growth, suggesting that internal control quality affects both core and non-core activities of banks. Overall, results suggest that strong internal controls improve bank risk-taking, in part through asymmetrically reducing downside risk-taking while facilitating upside risk-taking, ultimately improving bank performance.



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