scholarly journals Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Tavoni
Keyword(s):  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Impulse Balance

scholarly journals Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 × 2 Games: Comment

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 1029-1040 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Brunner ◽  
Colin F Camerer ◽  
Jacob K Goeree
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
The Other ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Laboratory Results ◽  
Impulse Balance

Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

scholarly journals Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 938-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinhard Selten ◽  
Thorsten Chmura
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Subject Group ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Impulse Balance

Five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2x2-games are experimentally compared: Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium (Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein 1998), and impulse balance equilibrium. Experiments on 12 games, 6 constant sum games, and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12 independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each nonconstant sum game. Each independent subject group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2, interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random matching. The comparison of the five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: impulse balance equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, Nash equilibrium. (JEL C70, C91)

scholarly journals Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 × 2 Games: Reply

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 1041-1044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinhard Selten ◽  
Thorsten Chmura ◽  
Sebastian J Goerg
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
New Findings ◽  
Computational Errors ◽  
Impulse Balance ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Non Parametric

This is a reply to “Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment” by Brunner, Camerer, and Goeree which corrects some computational errors in Selten and Chmura (2008) and extends the comparison of five stationary concepts to data from previous experimental studies. We critically discuss their new findings and relate them to the data of Selten and Chmura (2008). We conclude that the parametric concepts of action-sampling equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium perform better than quantal response equilibrium, and that the non-parametric concept of impulse-balance equilibrium performs at least as well as quantal response equilibrium. (JEL C70)

Social learning in networks: a Quantal Response Equilibrium analysis of experimental data

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syngjoo Choi ◽  
Douglas Gale ◽  
Shachar Kariv
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Social Learning ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Heterogeneity

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Error Rates ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Apparent Reason ◽  
Chess Players

Players have different skills, which has implications for the degree to which they make errors. Low-skill hitters in baseball often swing at bad pitches, beginning skiers frequently fall for no apparent reason, and children often lose at tic-tac-toe. At the other extreme, there are brilliant chess players, bargainers, and litigators who seem to know exactly what move to make or offer to decline. From a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) perspective, these skill levels can be modeled in terms of variation in error rates or in responsiveness of quantal response functions. This chapter explores issues related to individual heterogeneity with respect to player error rates. It also describes some extensions of QRE that relax the assumption that player expectations about the choice behavior of other players are correct. For example, in games that are played only once, players are not able to learn from others' prior decisions, and expectations must be based on introspection. The chapter develops the implications of noisy introspection embedded in a model of iterated thinking.

Endogenous quantal response equilibrium

2020 ◽  
Vol 124 ◽  
pp. 620-643
Author(s):  
Evan Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

scholarly journals Cybersecurity Analysis of Smart Manufacturing System Using Game Theory Approach and Quantal Response Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 1001-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alireza Zarreh ◽  
Can Saygin ◽  
HungDa Wan ◽  
Yooneun Lee ◽  
Alejandro Bracho ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Manufacturing System ◽  
Smart Manufacturing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Quantal Response Equilibrium in a Double Auction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Neri
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium
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