Quantal Response Equilibrium in a Double Auction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Neri
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Quantal response equilibrium in a double auction

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Neri
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Social learning in networks: a Quantal Response Equilibrium analysis of experimental data

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syngjoo Choi ◽  
Douglas Gale ◽  
Shachar Kariv
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Social Learning ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Heterogeneity

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Error Rates ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Apparent Reason ◽  
Chess Players

Players have different skills, which has implications for the degree to which they make errors. Low-skill hitters in baseball often swing at bad pitches, beginning skiers frequently fall for no apparent reason, and children often lose at tic-tac-toe. At the other extreme, there are brilliant chess players, bargainers, and litigators who seem to know exactly what move to make or offer to decline. From a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) perspective, these skill levels can be modeled in terms of variation in error rates or in responsiveness of quantal response functions. This chapter explores issues related to individual heterogeneity with respect to player error rates. It also describes some extensions of QRE that relax the assumption that player expectations about the choice behavior of other players are correct. For example, in games that are played only once, players are not able to learn from others' prior decisions, and expectations must be based on introspection. The chapter develops the implications of noisy introspection embedded in a model of iterated thinking.

Endogenous quantal response equilibrium

2020 ◽  
Vol 124 ◽  
pp. 620-643
Author(s):  
Evan Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

scholarly journals Cybersecurity Analysis of Smart Manufacturing System Using Game Theory Approach and Quantal Response Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 1001-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alireza Zarreh ◽  
Can Saygin ◽  
HungDa Wan ◽  
Yooneun Lee ◽  
Alejandro Bracho ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Manufacturing System ◽  
Smart Manufacturing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Applications to Political Science

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Threshold Level ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Special Case

This chapter considers a set of closely related binary-choice games that have been applied to model questions in political science. It starts with an analysis of “participation games,” which are n-player games where each player has only two possible actions: to participate or not. The payoff for either decision depends on the number of other players who make that decision. In some cases, a threshold level of participation is required for the group benefit to be obtained. The first example is the “volunteer's dilemma,” which pertains to the special case where the threshold is 1, that is, only a single volunteer is needed. The chapter ends with an analysis of bargaining situations, including an application of agent quantal response equilibrium to bilateral “crisis bargaining” and of Markov QRE to the Baron–Ferejohn model of multilateral “legislative bargaining.”

Quantal Response Equilibrium in Normal-Form Games

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Cost Model ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Best Response

This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” quantal or smoothed best-response functions required to satisfy four intuitive axioms of stochastic choice. A simple asymmetric matching pennies game is used to illustrate these ideas and show that QRE imposes strong restrictions on the data, even without parametric assumptions on the quantal response functions. Particular attention is given to the logit QRE, since it is the most commonly used approach taken when QRE is applied to experimental or other data. The discussion includes the topological and limiting properties of logit QRE and connections with refinement concepts. QRE is also related to several other equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior in games, including a game-theoretic equilibrium version of Luce's (1959) model of individual choice, Rosenthal's (1989) linear response model, and Van Damme's (1987) control cost model; these connections are explained in the chapter.

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