scholarly journals Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friederike Niepmann ◽  
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr
Keyword(s):  
International Linkages ◽  
Bank Bailouts

scholarly journals Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friederike Niepmann ◽  
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr
Keyword(s):  
International Linkages ◽  
Bank Bailouts

scholarly journals Bank Bailouts, International Linkages, and Cooperation

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 270-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friederike Niepmann ◽  
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
International Linkages ◽  
National Welfare ◽  
Tax Distortions ◽  
Bank Bailouts

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crises and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses, and intra- and intercountry income inequality, in the noncooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, a lack of burden sharing, and free riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare. (JEL C72, G01, G21, G28)

Competitive Distortions of Bank Bailouts

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Koetter ◽  
Felix Noth
Keyword(s):  
Bank Bailouts

Bank Bailouts, Bail-Ins, or No Regulatory Intervention? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
Charles P. Himmelberg ◽  
Raluca A. Roman ◽  
Sergey Tsyplakov
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Optimal Regulation ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Bank Bailouts ◽  
Regulatory Intervention

scholarly journals Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Ferreira ◽  
David Kershaw ◽  
Tom Kirchmaier ◽  
Edmund-Philipp Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Bank Bailouts

scholarly journals The Real Effects of Bank Distress: Evidence from Bank Bailouts in Germany

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Bersch ◽  
Hans Degryse ◽  
Thomas Kick ◽  
Ingrid Stein
Keyword(s):  
The Real ◽  
Real Effects ◽  
Bank Bailouts

scholarly journals International linkages, geopolitics, and the Belt and Road Initiative: A comparison of four island territories

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-ho Kwong ◽  
Mathew Y.H. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
International Politics ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
Faroe Islands ◽  
Belt And Road Initiative ◽  
Internal Factors ◽  
International Linkages ◽  
Belt And Road ◽  
The Belt And Road

Existing literature has placed a strong emphasis on foreign linkages for the sustainability of island territories. However, studies have largely focused the effect of Western linkages, leaving the rise of Asian linkages unexplored. Such an investigation is of increasing significance given China’s rise in global politics and its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This article explains island territories’ inclination towards this newfound Chinese influence by comparing two Danish island territories and two Chinese island territories and argues that island territories with strong international linkages tend to face more challenges to accept the BRI, as demonstrated by the cases of Greenland and Hong Kong with stronger US strategic, military, and diplomatic linkages; and vice versa for the Faroe Islands and Macau with relatively weak international linkages. This paper contributes to the literature by moving beyond internal factors, including island types, sizes, and peripheralities, to explore how external factors, namely foreign linkages in international politics, from an alternative geopolitical perspective.

scholarly journals Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Market ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Bank Bailouts ◽  
The Eu

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.

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