Policy Coordination in Fiscal Federalism: Drawing Lessons from the Dubai Debt Crisis

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serhan Cevik
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Policy Coordination

7. Policy-Making under Economic and Monetary Union Crisis, Change, and Continuity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dermot Hodson
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
De Novo ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
High Stakes

This chapter examines the role of the economic and monetary union (EMU) in the European Union’s macroeconomic policy-making. As of 2015, nineteen members of the euro area have exchanged national currencies for the euro and delegated responsibility for monetary policy and financial supervision to the European Central Bank (ECB). EMU is a high-stakes experiment in new modes of EU policy-making insofar as the governance of the euro area relies on alternatives to the traditional Community method, including policy coordination, intensive transgovernmentalism, and delegation to de novo bodies. The chapter first provides an overview of the origins of the EMU before discussing the launch of the single currency and the sovereign debt crisis. It also considers variations on the Community method, taking into account the ECB and the European Stability Mechanism.

scholarly journals COVID-19, Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Debt: Have We Reached a Critical Juncture?

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Hanniman
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Fiscal Sustainability ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Critical Juncture ◽  
Fiscal Capacity ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Canadian Federalism ◽  
The World

In 2019, Canada's gross subnational debt to GDP was well over 40 per cent, easily the highest in the world (see Figure 1). This level will only grow as the provinces grapple with the pandemic and its fiscal effects. Some believe surging provincial debts have brought Canadian federalism to a critical juncture: they have greatly increased the odds of federal measures to stabilize provincial finances. This article assesses this claim. The cleanest and most balanced path to fiscal sustainability is a combination of enhanced federal transfers, which would bolster provincial fiscal capacity, and national fiscal rules, which would constrain provincial borrowing. But the former is unlikely to restore sustainability on its own, and the latter would require a severe provincial debt crisis, which Canada's existing fiscal federal structures can avoid. COVID-19 has increased the odds of certain reforms, and it is difficult to predict their long-run effects. But any obvious paths to fiscal sustainability remain hidden.

Austerity and European Social Rights: How Can Courts Protect Europe's Lost Generation?

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 1145-1176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Poulou
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Lost Generation ◽  
The Eu

The European financial crisis has called many of the assumptions of the constitutional structure of the European Union (EU) into question. The market-based model of the European Monetary Union (EMU) led to an improper assessment of the borrowing capacity of the euro-area Member States and a mispricing of their default risk. Another design flaw of the EMU that has been exposed by the crisis was the weakness of the existing framework for economic policy coordination. The factual interdependence of the participating economies in the monetary union was so strong that the denial of some form of assistance to the debt-distressed countries triggered a domino effect in the Eurozone as a whole. The quest for instruments to address the sovereign debt crisis brought a European constitutional crisis to the forefront: the EU did not possess the appropriate mechanisms to help the states in need and to guarantee financial stability in the EMU.

Intra-eurozone Payments Imbalances: Implications for the TARGET2 Payments System

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-357
Author(s):  
Bill Lucarelli
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Political Union ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Core ◽  
Payments System

In the wake of the recent European debt crisis, there have emerged serious payments imbalances between the core/surplus countries and the peripheral/deficit countries, which threaten the internal cohesion of the eurozone. In the absence of political union or fiscal federalism, these centrifugal dynamics appear to be irreversible. This article examines the role performed by the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) payments system and the very real possibility of default by the indebted, peripheral countries as a result of the imposition of austerity policies by the European Central Bank (ECB)/European Union (EU)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Troika). It is proposed that the current, neoliberal path toward austerity and wage repression (or internal devaluation) is ultimately unsustainable and, indeed, self-defeating. JEL Classification: B5, B14, B16, B23

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