An Analysis of the View that the Corporate Governance Systems Worldwide are Inevitably Converging Towards a Model Based on Shareholder Primacy and Dispersed Ownership Structure

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Ikol Adungo

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 76-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto de Miguel Hidalgo ◽  
Julio Pindado ◽  
Chabela de la Torre

This paper analyses how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Our analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and performance is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and performance.





2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 606-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela M. Salvioni ◽  
Francesca Gennari

The main finding of this article is that sustainability and the broader concept of social responsibility imply a change in the spirit of governance, which promotes the so-called ’de facto convergence’ between the different corporate governance systems existing all over the world. Substantial corporate governance convergence suggests that different countries may have different companies’ ownership structure, rules and institutions but the corporate boards may still be able to perform common goals, with attention to similar key performance indicators, such as ensuring fair disclosure or accountability. Companies that perform better with regard to the triple bottom line can increase shareholder value contributing, at the same time, to the sustainable development of the societies in which they operate.



2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-442
Author(s):  
Uday Khanna ◽  
Pankaj Madan

Worldwide considerable amount of research on corporate governance focuses on ownership structure and board characteristics of companies and linking these to their performance but fewer studies have been found on the linkage between market capitalization of the firms and the quality of corporate governance practices. This study is an attempt to showcase the linkage between market capitalization and quality of corporate governance practices of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of firms with different market capitalization on the quality of corporate governance in Indian companies. As India is one of such countries where corporate governance systems are in the evolutionary stage, the findings could also be useful for other newly liberalized and globalizing economies.



2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zouari-Hadiji Rim ◽  
Ghazi ZOUARI

In the theoretical framework of corporate governance, this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers for the purpose of privileging investment in R&D. This efficiency is sensitive to national systems of governance. Tests realized on a sample of 531 U.S., Japanese and French firms with the canonical method corroborate the existence of positive relationships between concentration of ownership, the internal administrator dominance and the non-dual structure on the one hand, and the investment in R&D, on the other.



2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24
Author(s):  
Ariane Chapelle

This paper investigates the common patterns of ownership structure across different corporate governance systems. We test the predictions of Zwiebel (1995) using ownership data of Belgian listed companies in 1995 and in 1999. Results show good applicability of the model. This empirical research relates to other contributions performing tests for Hungary, Poland, and Spain. Next the model and its limitations are discussed. The paper opens promising fields for research in ownership structure modeling adapted to corporate governance systems of Continental and Eastern Europe.



2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret M. Blair

In the heated debate of the last fifteen years over which of the world’s many different corporate governance systems are best, the shareholder primacy advocates thought they had won at the turn of the century. Now, in 2002, the helium has come out of the formerly high-flying technology and information infrastructure sectors that were leading the U.S. economic expansion in the 1990s, and the Enron fiasco and accounting scandals at numerous other U.S. corporations have exposed deep flaws in the system that had been held up as the model for all the world to follow. Many possible lessons can be drawn. At least one is that the high-powered incentives provided by stock option compensation may produce perverse behavior that can, in turn, undermine institutional arrangements that support and foster mutual trust and cooperation. The study of corporate governance must focus on more than just how to get management to maximize value for shareholders. It must also be about the human institutions that bind people together in cooperative relationship over long periods of time.







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