Measuring Multilateralism: Ideal Point Estimates of State Preferences Over Global Treaties

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
State Preferences

Where Does the President Stand? Measuring Presidential Ideology

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Treier
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Point Estimates

Although estimating the revealed preferences of members of Congress is straightforward, estimating the position of the president relative to Congress is not. Current estimates place the president as considerably more ideologically extreme than one would expect. These estimates, however, are very sensitive to the set of presidential positions used in the roll call analyses for the 103rd through 109th Congresses. The president often obtains more moderate ideal point estimates relative to Congress when including positions based on signing bills into law.

Integrating Voting Theory and Roll Call Analysis: A Framework

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Clinton ◽  
Adam Meirowitz
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Testing Procedure ◽  
Formal Modeling ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Federal Aid ◽  
Voting Theory ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Legislative Studies ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Hypothesis Testing Procedure

Scholars of legislative studies typically use ideal point estimates from scaling procedures to test theories of legislative politics. We contend that theory and methods may be better integrated by directly incorporating maintained and to be tested hypotheses in the statistical model used to estimate legislator preferences. In this view of theory and estimation, formal modeling (1) provides auxiliary assumptions that serve as constraints in the estimation process, and (2) generates testable predictions. The estimation and hypothesis testing procedure uses roll call data to evaluate the validity of theoretically derived to be tested hypotheses in a world where maintained hypotheses are presumed true. We articulate the approach using the language of statistical inference (both frequentist and Bayesian). The approach is demonstrated in analyses of the well-studied Powell amendment to the federal aid-to-education bill in the 84th House and the Compromise of 1790 in the 1st House.

scholarly journals Change We Can Believe In? Using Political Science to Predict Policy Change in the Obama Presidency

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 329-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Woon
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Congressional Election ◽  
Partisan Polarization ◽  
Point Estimates

Based on the results of the 2008 presidential and congressional elections, an analysis using theories and methods of modern political science (pivotal politics theory, ideal point estimates, and bootstrap simulations) suggests that the conditions are ripe for real policy change. Specifically, we should expect policies to move significantly in a liberal direction, few or no policies should move in a conservative direction, and many of the outcomes will be moderate or somewhat to the left of center (rather than far left). Furthermore, the predictions depend as much on partisan polarization and the results of the congressional election as they do on the outcome of presidential election itself.

Monetary Policy Committees and Voting Behavior

2019 ◽  
pp. 38-58
Author(s):  
Sylvester Eijffinger ◽  
Ronald Mahieu ◽  
Louis Raes
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Point Estimation ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Monetary Policy Committees ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Traditional Approaches ◽  
Ideal Point Estimation

In this chapter we suggest to use Bayesian ideal point estimation to analyze voting in monetary policy committees. Using data from the Riksbank we demonstrate what this entails and we compare ideal point estimates with the results from traditional approaches. We end by suggesting possible extensions.

Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Royce Carroll ◽  
Jeffrey B. Lewis ◽  
James Lo ◽  
Keith T. Poole ◽  
Howard Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Point ◽  
Parametric Bootstrap ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Measuring Bias

scholarly journals Structured-Induced Deference or Equal and Coordinate Actor: Congressional Influence on American Foreign Policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-118
Author(s):  
Eric Paul Svensen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Scholarly Attention

Perhaps no separation of powers issue receives as much scholarly attention as the near monopoly modern presidents exert over foreign policy. Yet, despite an extensive literature on the subject, scholars have drawn different conclusions as to the causes of this change, finding that lawmakers either defer to the president or are equal and coordinate actors on foreign policy. Using the separation of powers as a guide, I attempt to rectify these differences and demonstrate instances in the roll call record where examples of both explanations are most evident. Recovering ideal point estimates between the 87th and 112th Congress on votes highlighting competing governmental objectives, findings show that the chamber median frequently shifts toward the president on foreign policy votes in the final passage stage and during the treaty process. However, evidence also shows Congress is less likely to defer to the president on domestic legislation and appropriations.

Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander V. Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Monte Carlo Study ◽  
Small Samples ◽  
Party Government ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Ideal Points

This paper analyzes the use of ideal point estimates for testing pivot theories of lawmaking such as Krehbiel's (1998, Pivotal politics: A theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago) pivotal politics and Cox and McCubbins's (2005, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representations. New York: Cambridge University Press) party cartel model. Among the prediction of pivot theories is that all pivotal legislators will vote identically on all successful legislation. Clinton (2007, Lawmaking and roll calls. Journal of Politics 69:455–67) argues that the estimated ideal points of the pivotal legislators are therefore predicted to be statistically indistinguishable and false when estimated from the set of successful final passage roll call votes, which implies that ideal point estimates cannot logically be used to test pivot theories. I show using Monte Carlo simulation that when pivot theories are augmented with probabilistic voting, Clinton's prediction only holds in small samples when voting is near perfect. I furthermore show that the predicted bias is unlikely to be consequential with U.S. Congressional voting data. My analysis suggests that the methodology of estimating ideal points to compute theoretically relevant quantities for empirical tests is not inherently flawed in the case of pivot theories.

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