A Global Games Approach to Sovereign Default and Debt Crises

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Menzies
Author(s):  
Vivian Zhanwei Yue ◽  
Bin Wei

This article reviews the literature on sovereign debt, that is, debt issued by a national government. The defining characteristic of sovereign debt is the limited mechanisms for enforcement. Because a sovereign government does not face legal consequences of default, the reasons why it makes repayment are to avoid default penalties related to reputation loss or economic cost. Theoretical and quantitative studies on sovereign debt have investigated the cause and impact of sovereign default and produced analysis of policy relevance. This article reviews the theories that quantitatively account for key empirical facts about sovereign debt. These studies enable researchers and policy makers to better understand sovereign debt crises.


2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 1676-1706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen M Reinhart ◽  
Kenneth S Rogoff

Newly developed historical time series on public debt, along with data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the debt cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. We test three related hypotheses at both “world” aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, external debt surges are an antecedent to banking crises. Second, banking crises (domestic and those in financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises; we find they help predict them. Third, public borrowing surges ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have “hidden domestic debts” that exceed the better documented levels of external debt. (JEL E44, F34, F44, G01, H63, N20)


Author(s):  
Jesus Crespo Cuaresma ◽  
Gallina A. Vincelette ◽  
Luca Bandiera
Keyword(s):  

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