Sovereign Debt Ratings and Stock Liquidity Around the World

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuan-Hui Lee ◽  
Horacio Sapriza ◽  
Yangru Wu
2016 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 99-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuan-Hui Lee ◽  
Horacio Sapriza ◽  
Yangru Wu

Author(s):  
Sean Fleming

States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, held liable for debts and reparations, bound by treaties, and punished with sanctions. But what does it mean to hold a state responsible as opposed to a government, a nation, or an individual leader? Under what circumstances should we assign responsibility to states rather than individuals? This book demystifies the phenomenon of state responsibility and explains why it is a challenging yet indispensable part of modern politics. Taking Thomas Hobbes' theory of the state as a starting point, the book presents a theory of state responsibility that sheds new light on sovereign debt, historical reparations, treaty obligations, and economic sanctions. Along the way, it overturns longstanding interpretations of Hobbes' political thought, explores how new technologies will alter the practice of state responsibility as we know it, and develops new accounts of political authority, representation, and legitimacy. The book argues that Hobbes' idea of the state offers a far richer and more realistic conception of state responsibility than the theories prevalent today and demonstrates that Hobbes' Leviathan is much more than an anthropomorphic “artificial man.” The book is essential reading for political theorists, scholars of international relations, international lawyers, and philosophers. It recovers a forgotten understanding of state personality in Hobbes' thought and shows how to apply it to the world of imperfect states in which we live.


2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Herman

This essay characterizes the main actors and how they operate during a buildup of government foreign debt and after a default on payments. These actors are the borrowing governments, domestic and foreign commercial banks, purchasers of government bonds, other governments lending to the debtor, and multilateral institutions (the International Monetary Fund and development banks). As there is no international sovereign analog to national court-supervised bankruptcy in the case of countries, the workout from crises, mainly hitting poorer economies, occurs without legislated rules or an enforcement mechanism, although the IMF (sometimes with the World Bank) serves as an informal umpire for the global financial community.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 1867-1910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilian Ng ◽  
Fei Wu ◽  
Jing Yu ◽  
Bohui Zhang

2011 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. F13-F21
Author(s):  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Aurélie Delannoy ◽  
Tatiana Fic ◽  
Ian Hurst ◽  
Iana Liadze ◽  
...  

Global economic prospects have deteriorated markedly in recent months. Risks around our central forecast have shifted distinctly to the downside. Much of this is due to the heightened uncertainty surrounding Europe's sovereign debt crisis. There is widespread agreement among policymakers - ranging from the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank to individual heads of state both within and outside the Euro Area - that resolution to the crisis requires urgent, comprehensive and coordinated action. Yet 17 months after the first bail-out programme was introduced in Greece, policymakers have failed to deliver a strategy that promises a credible prospect of growth and an end to rising debt profiles. Solvency concerns in three relatively small peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), combined with weakening growth across the continent, raise the dangerous spectre of illiquidity beginning to affect solvency in the larger core economies with high debt ratios - notably Italy. Left unchecked, the consequences would be severe for the world economy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Vermeiren

In this article, I engage with the chartalist literature to explore the political foundations of international currencies. Drawing on this literature as well as on recent scholarship on the shortage of safe assets in the world economy, I challenge a prevailing premise of the International Political Economy literature that international currency status needs to be based on conservative macroeconomic policy institutions and practices, which is deemed necessary to maintain foreign confidence in the stability of the real value of the international currency. I contend that international currency status in the post-crisis world economy hinges on the willingness and capacity of the currency provider to adopt accommodating monetary and fiscal policies. First, the central bank needs to offer a backstop to the market for sovereign debt securities by acting as a lender of last resort to the government, whereas fiscal policy expansion is necessary to sufficiently expand the stock of the only securities that can assume the function of genuinely safe assets: sovereign debt. Second, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies enable the international currency issuer to supply safe assets to the rest of the world by running deficits on its trade balance. This article analyses how the European Central Bank’s monetary policy decisions in the wake of the crisis ran against these two prerequisites, constraining the Eurozone to become a large net provider of safe assets in the world economy. By linking these decisions to the creditor and export interests of the Northern Eurozone countries, it disputes the European Central Bank’s ‘neutral stance’ regarding the internationalization of the euro.


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