World Overview

2011 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. F13-F21
Author(s):  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Aurélie Delannoy ◽  
Tatiana Fic ◽  
Ian Hurst ◽  
Iana Liadze ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
European Central ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
The World ◽  
Heads Of State ◽  
Bail Out

Global economic prospects have deteriorated markedly in recent months. Risks around our central forecast have shifted distinctly to the downside. Much of this is due to the heightened uncertainty surrounding Europe's sovereign debt crisis. There is widespread agreement among policymakers - ranging from the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank to individual heads of state both within and outside the Euro Area - that resolution to the crisis requires urgent, comprehensive and coordinated action. Yet 17 months after the first bail-out programme was introduced in Greece, policymakers have failed to deliver a strategy that promises a credible prospect of growth and an end to rising debt profiles. Solvency concerns in three relatively small peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), combined with weakening growth across the continent, raise the dangerous spectre of illiquidity beginning to affect solvency in the larger core economies with high debt ratios - notably Italy. Left unchecked, the consequences would be severe for the world economy.

scholarly journals THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE PERIOD OF SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

Ekonomika ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-31
Author(s):  
Deimantė Andriuškevičiūtė ◽  
Norbertas Balčiūnas
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
European Central

Abstract. The European Central Bank was forced to start using non-standard measures in order to manage the situation determined by the global financial and sovereign debt crisis, namely to sort out liquidity problems and expand credit supply. The European Central Bank is criticized for applying non-standard tools because of increase in inflation risk. However, the analysis shows that the inflation could be managed by the absorption of liquidity surplus. However, there is a negative side of using non-standard measures, such as a significant increase in the credit risk, which arises due to having government bonds in the balance sheet of the European Central Bank. In addition, this indicates that the European Central Bank indirectly finances governments.Key words: monetary policy, inflation, sovereign debt crisis, credit risk, quantitative easing

scholarly journals The democratic deficit and European Central Bank crisis monetary policies

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Lena Högenauer ◽  
David Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
European Central ◽  
International Financial Crisis

This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the argument – defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik – that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to the international financial crisis, the ECB’s monetary policies were shaped entirely by the interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty provisions.

The EU’s Most Influential Economic Policy-maker: Mario Draghi at the European Central Bank

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 345-352
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Asset Price Bubbles ◽  
European Central ◽  
Economic Policy Maker

Abstract This article assesses the legacy of Mario Draghi as president of the European Central Bank (ECB) from 2011 to 2019, with particular reference to the Greek’s sovereign debt crisis. Most macro-economic indicators improved over the course of Draghi’s tenure at the ECB, including inflation, budget deficits, yield spreads among euro-area borrowers and unemployment. Draghi played a decisive role in turning the tide on the crisis of confidence that afflicted the euro area and threatened the survival of Europe’s single currency in the wake of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis. Yet the ECB’s unconventional policies prompted sustained controversy and contributed to a low level of trust in the central bank among people in the euro-area member states. The focus of controversy has been on possible asset-price bubbles and ‘hidden’ transfers between euro-area member states. When and how to normalize its policies is a major challenge for the ECB, as it is for other major central banks that adapted similar policies in response to the global financial crisis.

The European Central Bank

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Defining Moment ◽  
European Central ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
History Of

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.

The Independence of the European Central Bank

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-68
Author(s):  
Ulrike Neyer
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central ◽  
New Instruments

Abstract The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically. Zusammenfassung Die EZB ist formal unabhängig von Weisungen der Regierungen. Während und nach der Finanzkrise und der akuten Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum hat die EZB neue Instrumente eingesetzt und neue Aufgaben und Verantwortlichkeiten übernommen, die zu Diskussionen über die Unabhängigkeit der EZB geführt haben. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert diese Arbeit zwei Fragen. Erstens, stellen die neuen Instrumente und Aufgaben der EZB eine Gefahr für ihre Unabhängigkeit dar? Zweitens, ist der Einsatz der neuen Instrumente und die Übernahme der neuen Aufgaben von einer unabhängigen Institu­tion in einer Demokratie zu rechtfertigen, oder besteht ein relevantes Demokratiedefizit? Bezüglich dieser beiden Fragen kommt die Arbeit zu dem Ergebnis, dass insbesondere das Programm zum Ankauf von Anleihen des öffentlichen Sektors (Public Sector Purchase Programme, PSPP) und die von der EZB übernommene Bankenaufsicht (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) kritisch zu beurteilen sind. JEL Classification: E42; E52; E58

The World Economy: Forecast Summary

2016 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. F2-F2
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Banking System ◽  
List Type ◽  
European Central ◽  
The World ◽  
Single Rulebook

The world economy is expected to grow by 3.0 per cent in 2016, an unchanged forecast from the May Review. However, world growth in 2017 is revised down to 3.3 per cent from 3.5 per cent.A number of financial sector risks remain. Many large Euro Area banks are fragile, with the banking system in Italy particularly weak. This is likely to test the viability of the Single Rulebook covering financial services.Inflation is likely to be below target in the OECD economies in 2017. The European Central Bank (ECB) stands ready to ease monetary conditions while the Federal Reserve is likely to raise interest rates very gradually.

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