Means and Ends in the Roberts Court: Ignoring the Lawyerrs Craft to Reshape Administrative Law

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Healy
2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-71
Author(s):  
Gillian E. Metzger

Author(s):  
Michael P. Healy

In last year’s term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straight forward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article discusses and criticizes the approach of Justice Scalia writing for the majority and of Chief Justice Roberts writing for three dissenting Justices.Practitioners and scholars of administrative law can only be confused by the Court’s willingness to apply Chevron in City of Arlington, given the informal administrative action being reviewed and the fact that neither reviewing court actually applied each of the two parts of the Mead test. The Court’s flawed administrative law analysis results from the activist concerns of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia uses the case as a vehicle to undermine Mead, a decision that Justice Scalia loathes. Chief Justice Roberts uses the case as a vehicle to advocate for less judicial deference and less law defining power for increasingly powerful agencies. Neither member of the Court allowed the applicable rules of contemporary administrative law to hinder his efforts to achieve his broader goals. Administrative law would have been better served if a properly restrained Court had considered and applied the previously determined rules for judicial review of administrative agencies. 


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Oliver Westerwinter

Abstract Friedrich Kratochwil engages critically with the emergence of a global administrative law and its consequences for the democratic legitimacy of global governance. While he makes important contributions to our understanding of global governance, he does not sufficiently discuss the differences in the institutional design of new forms of global law-making and their consequences for the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance. I elaborate on these limitations and outline a comparative research agenda on the emergence, design, and effectiveness of the diverse arrangements that constitute the complex institutional architecture of contemporary global governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-97
Author(s):  
Sarip Sarip ◽  
Nur Rahman ◽  
Rohadi Rohadi

This article aims to explore the relationship between the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) and the Ministry of Villages (Kemendes) from theconstitutional law and state administrative law point of view.The second concerns of this research is the disharmony and problem between the two ministries.From the constitutional law point of view, it turns out that what the Ministry of Home Affairs is doing, is closer to the object of its discussion. The method used in this research is normative legal research bycomparingthe constitutional law and state administrative law to obtain clarity regarding the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Village. The result shows that the Ministry of Village approached the science of state administrative law, namely to revive or give spirits to the village. Disharmonization began to exist since the inception of the Ministry of Village. The root of disharmony itself was the improper application of constitutional foundations in the formation of the Village Law. It would be better if the government reassess the constitutional foundation for the village.


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