The Use of Consensus Arguments in Transnational Judicial Decision-Making: Confirming or Jeopardising Universal Human Rights

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin Henrard ◽  
Elaine Mak
ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla M Zoethout

AbstractOver the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems more and more inclined to use foreign sources of law, that is to say, law that does not originate in the Convention itself or in one of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Unlike in the US, there is little discussion in Europe about this form of judicial dialogue in the case-law of the ECtHR. This paper seeks both to clarify transnational dialogue by the ECtHR and find ways to justify this practice, against the backdrop of the American debate on this topic. First, the concept of transnational judicial dialogue is analysed (Part II). Then judicial dialogue as it presents itself in the judgments of the ECtHR is assessed, especially when non-Convention or foreign law is being used in a substantive way (Part III). Subsequently, an attempt is made to define when and why the use of foreign law by the ECtHR can be considered a justifiable approach in judicial decision-making (Part IV). The paper rounds off with some concluding remarks (Part V).


Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Costa

The chapter first gives several examples of where ‘dignity’ (or ‘a person’s dignity’, or ‘human dignity’) has been a central element in the reasoning of the Court, or in the arguments advanced by judges in separate opinions. Based on this analysis, the principal question addressed is why the Court draws on ‘dignity’, a word neither explicitly nor, implicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention or the Protocols. What are the reasons for having—or not having—recourse to the concept of dignity in judicial decisions? Is there any objective reason for such choice? Or does it depend on the subjective preferences of the judges sitting on the bench? Is ‘dignity’ necessary for judicial decision-making in order to reach a specific conclusion in a case? Or does ‘dignity’ simply reinforce the legal reasoning of the Court, enabling the Court to give more weight to the arguments of one of the parties in the case? Finally, the chapter looks for a possible conceptual link between human dignity and human rights, insofar as this arises from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 585-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Brett

Rationalist models of judicial decision-making expect courts to defend their institutional integrity in politically sensitive cases. This article presents two African case studies of courts not doing so. They have elicited predictable backlash from executives and placed their institutions in avoidable danger. I argue that judges’ desire for esteem from emerging global judicial networks can explain this otherwise puzzling behaviour. These new networks become particularly salient in human rights cases. This conclusion partially supports Anne-Marie Slaughter’s controversial claims about the significance of ‘the global community of law’ but also identifies risks this poses for courts’ domestic authority. The argument is made with reference to two recent and well-known decisions by the High Court of Botswana and the Southern African Development Community Tribunal. The first case, Sesana (2006), dealt with the vexed question of indigenous rights in Africa. The second case, Campbell (2008), concerned the compensation of expropriated commercial farmers from Zimbabwe.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ◽  
Chris Guthrie ◽  
Andrew J. Wistrich

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