Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Costa
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
European Court ◽  
Conceptual Link

The chapter first gives several examples of where ‘dignity’ (or ‘a person’s dignity’, or ‘human dignity’) has been a central element in the reasoning of the Court, or in the arguments advanced by judges in separate opinions. Based on this analysis, the principal question addressed is why the Court draws on ‘dignity’, a word neither explicitly nor, implicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention or the Protocols. What are the reasons for having—or not having—recourse to the concept of dignity in judicial decisions? Is there any objective reason for such choice? Or does it depend on the subjective preferences of the judges sitting on the bench? Is ‘dignity’ necessary for judicial decision-making in order to reach a specific conclusion in a case? Or does ‘dignity’ simply reinforce the legal reasoning of the Court, enabling the Court to give more weight to the arguments of one of the parties in the case? Finally, the chapter looks for a possible conceptual link between human dignity and human rights, insofar as this arises from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.

The European Court of Human Rights and Transnational Judicial Dialogue

ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla M Zoethout
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
The Past ◽  
European Court ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
The Us

AbstractOver the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems more and more inclined to use foreign sources of law, that is to say, law that does not originate in the Convention itself or in one of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Unlike in the US, there is little discussion in Europe about this form of judicial dialogue in the case-law of the ECtHR. This paper seeks both to clarify transnational dialogue by the ECtHR and find ways to justify this practice, against the backdrop of the American debate on this topic. First, the concept of transnational judicial dialogue is analysed (Part II). Then judicial dialogue as it presents itself in the judgments of the ECtHR is assessed, especially when non-Convention or foreign law is being used in a substantive way (Part III). Subsequently, an attempt is made to define when and why the use of foreign law by the ECtHR can be considered a justifiable approach in judicial decision-making (Part IV). The paper rounds off with some concluding remarks (Part V).

scholarly journals Who are judicial decisions meant for? The ‘global community of law’ in Southern Africa

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 585-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Brett
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Indigenous Rights ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Global Community ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
High Court ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
First Case ◽  
Vexed Question

Rationalist models of judicial decision-making expect courts to defend their institutional integrity in politically sensitive cases. This article presents two African case studies of courts not doing so. They have elicited predictable backlash from executives and placed their institutions in avoidable danger. I argue that judges’ desire for esteem from emerging global judicial networks can explain this otherwise puzzling behaviour. These new networks become particularly salient in human rights cases. This conclusion partially supports Anne-Marie Slaughter’s controversial claims about the significance of ‘the global community of law’ but also identifies risks this poses for courts’ domestic authority. The argument is made with reference to two recent and well-known decisions by the High Court of Botswana and the Southern African Development Community Tribunal. The first case, Sesana (2006), dealt with the vexed question of indigenous rights in Africa. The second case, Campbell (2008), concerned the compensation of expropriated commercial farmers from Zimbabwe.

When Do Courts Constrain the Authoritarian State? Judicial Decision-Making in Jordan and Palestine

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D. Schaaf
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Authoritarian State ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
State Activity ◽  
State Actors

Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors.

Do Not Ignore the Elephant... Exploring the Role of Intuition and Experience in Judicial Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Deliberative System ◽  
Experiential System ◽  
Analytical System

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.

Law Matters

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Strict Interpretation ◽  
Commerce Clause

Building on the theoretical model of Chapter 3, this chapter seeks to assess whether “law” affects judicial decisions independently of policy preferences. Numerous legal doctrines may shape judicial decision-making, including stare decisis, originalism, plain meaning, the promotion of democratic participation, and doctrines with regard to specific elements of the Constitution such as the Bill of Rights or the commerce clause. The chapter concentrates on three legal doctrines (stare decisis, strict interpretation of the Constitution, and judicial restraint) that are both prominent and clearly more likely to play a role in structuring decision-making on some cases than on others. These doctrines are not necessarily canons of jurisprudence that are universally shared; they are principles that are widely acknowledged in the legal world as appropriately influencing constitutional interpretation.

scholarly journals Analyzing the Link between Dollars and Decisions: A Multi-State Study of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Rebe
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
State Study ◽  
Previous Election

<p>This article examines the causal connection between attorney contributions and judicial decisions in elective states.  The results show that contributions are a significant predictor of appellant success in state supreme courts when judges receive contributions from the attorneys for the appellant.  However, this relationship is contingent on the competitiveness of the judicial seat.  The analysis shows that judges who received a low percentage of the vote in the previous election are more likely to vote with contributors than judges who received a high percentage.  This evidence bolsters the argument that contributions directly affect decision making when judges feel electoral pressure.  The results also support the proposition that elected judges are more likely to vote with donors in states with nonpartisan ballots.  While the contribution amounts are higher in partisan states, the judges in the nonpartisan sample are more closely aligned with their contributors when it comes to decision making. </p>

scholarly journals Why Attacks on Civic Space Matter in Strasbourg: The European Convention on Human Rights, Civil Society and Civic Space

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-37
Author(s):  
Antoine Buyse
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
European Court ◽  
Civic Space ◽  
Work First

This article explores the role of the European Convention on Human Rights in addressing the issue of attacks on civic space, but also the potential effects of shrinking civic space on Strasbourg’s work. First, an overview of the notions of civil society and civic space is given, linking these concepts to democracy and human rights. Subsequently, the formal and informal roles for civil society in the judicial decision-making are discussed. Finally, the substantive protection offered to civil society and civic space under the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is analysed. This article argues that the differentiations in theory on the varying contributions of civil society to democracy and human rights are to a large extent reflected in Strasbourg jurisprudence. Even more importantly, the ECHR system and civil society benefit from each other. This is why the current attacks on civic space are not just a problem for civil society itself, but also for the work of the European Court: it is submitted that a shrinking of civic space can also negatively affect the Strasbourg system, as the two are intertwined to a considerable extent.Received: 06 July 2019Accepted: 10 October 2019Published online: 20 December 2019

Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1005-1032 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Jacob
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Progressive Development ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Judicial Lawmaking ◽  
International Adjudication ◽  
Restraining Force

This paper deals with the role of judicial decisions in international adjudication. It is impossible to fail to notice the abundance of prior cases invoked in decisions of international tribunals and that, in order to find out what the law actually is, reference to previous cases is all but inevitable in practice. In some areas of international law, judicial or arbitral decisions have even been said to be the centre of progressive development. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable and deeply-rooted professional trepidation in many parts of the world regarding this enduring phenomenon. Even absent a fully articulated theory of adjudication or legal reasoning, the very idea of “judicial lawmaking” tends to arouse instinctive suspicion, especially when coupled with a denial of any restraining force of prior cases. Be that as it may, observations to the extent that judicial decisions are not veritable sources of international law or only binding between the parties in a particular dispute are only the beginning, and far from the end, of the present inquiry. Several interrelated and intricate questions need to be disentangled and dealt with in order to get a better grasp on what is commonly, and often rather unhelpfully, lumped together loosely under the vague label of “judicial precedent.” The paper is hence partly descriptive and partly revisionary. I do not however intend to rehash general criticisms or defences of precedent. Instead, I aim to present precedent as a general and omnipresent jurisprudential concept that enables and constrains judicial decision-making even in seemingly ordinary cases and to then showcase the specificities of one particular legal system in this respect, namely public international law. Hopefully this provides some of the methodological groundwork for other questions central to the present project, not least concerning the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking.

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