The Right to Be Forgotten in the Google Spain Case (Case C-131/12): A Clear Victory for Data Protection or an Obstacle for the Internet?

Author(s):  
Ioannis Iglezakis
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-101
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Gebuza

AbstractThe main aim of the article is to provide analysis on the notion of the right to be forgotten developed by the CJEU in the ruling Google v. AEPD & Gonzalez and by the General Data Protection Regulation within the context of the processing of personal data on the Internet. The analysis provides the comparison of approach towards the notion between European and American jurisprudence and doctrine, in order to demonstrate the scale of difficulty in applying the concept in practice.


Author(s):  
Hans Graux ◽  
Jef Ausloos ◽  
Peggy Valcke

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 55-65
Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini ◽  
Edoardo Celeste

AbstractThis article explores the challenges of the extraterritorial application of the right to be forgotten and, more broadly, of EU data protection law in light of the recent case law of the ECJ. The paper explains that there are good arguments for the EU to apply its high data protection standards outside its borders, but that such an extraterritorial application faces challenges, as it may clash with duties of international comity, legal diversity, or contrasting rulings delivered by courts in other jurisdictions. As the article points out from a comparative perspective, the protection of privacy in the digital age increasingly exposes a tension between efforts by legal systems to impose their high standards of data protection outside their borders – a dynamic which could be regarded as ‘imperialist’ – and claims by other legal systems to assert their own power over data – a dynamic which one could name ‘sovereigntist’. As the article suggests, navigating between the Scylla of imperialism and the Charybdis of sovereigntism will not be an easy task. In this context, greater convergence in the data protection framework of liberal democratic systems worldwide appears as the preferable path to secure privacy in the digital age.


Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.


Author(s):  
Federica Casarosa ◽  
Dianora Poletti

The right to be forgotten has come to the forefront of the academic debate as a reaction to Court of Justice's decision in case C-507/17 Google LLC c. CNIL concerning the issue of geographical extension of the delisting obligation. Along with the development of CJEU jurisprudence, national courts have developed their own caselaw interpreting and adapting the right to be forgotten, now included in art 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation, to the pre-existing legal framework. Italian courts, and in particular the Italian Supreme Court, have addressed in several occasions the features and facets of the right to be forgotten, and the recent decision of the Grand Chamber (n. 19681, 22 July 2019) is the last though not the least. Starting form this decision, the chapter will analyse how the Supreme Court has attempted to systematise the right to be forgotten distinguishing what is called the traditional application of the right from the ones emerging in the digital context.


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