The Right To Be Forgotten

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.

scholarly journals Right to be forgotten: european data imperialism, national privilege, or universal human right?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-152
Author(s):  
Oskar J. Gstrein
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Data ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The Digital Age has fundamentally reshaped the preconditions for privacy and freedom of expression. This transpires in the debate about a "right to be forgotten". While the 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in "Google Spain" touches upon the underlying issue of how increasing amounts of personal data affects individuals over time, the topic has also become one of the salient problems of Internet Governance. On 24th September 2019 the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in "Google vs CNIL" (C-507/17) which was supposed to clarify the territorial scope of the right. However, this judgment has raised doubts about the enforceability of the General Data Protection Regulation, and reveals the complex, multi-layered governance structure of the European Union. Acknowledging such complexity at a substantive and institutional level, this article starts by analysing the judgment. Additionally, to better understand the current situation in the European Union and its member states, recently produced draft guidelines by the European Data Protection Board are presented and discussed, as well as two judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court. Subsequently, the European developments are put in international context. Finally, the insights from these sections are combined which allows to develop several conceptual ideas. In conclusion, it is argued that the right to be forgotten remains complex and evolving. Its success depends on effective multi-layer and multistakeholder interaction. In this sense, it has become a prominent study object that reveals potential venues and pitfalls on a path towards more sophisticated data protection frameworks.

The Right to Be Forgotten in the European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 485-502
Author(s):  
Miquel Peguera
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Sensitive Data ◽  
General Data Protection Regulation ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
General Data ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses data protection aspects of liability of online intermediaries with special emphasis on the right to be forgotten as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and later by national courts in Europe. It considers also relevant provisions within the General Data Protection Regulation and how they affect online intermediaries’ activities. This chapter briefly considers two manifestations of the right to be forgotten as they are being currently applied in the EU. First, the right to be forgotten vis-à-vis internet search engines; that is, the right to be delisted from search results. Secondly, the right-to-be-forgotten claims directed against primary publishers to have the information deleted or anonymized at the source. In doing so, this chapter will point to hotly debated issues, recently addressed by the CJEU, such as the geographical scope of the right to be forgotten, that is its possible extraterritorial application, and the prohibition of processing of sensitive data that should theoretically apply to all data controllers, including those online intermediaries that qualify as such. This chapter also considers how balancing of rights should occur when right-to-be-forgotten claims to delist content are brought against search engines or publishers.

scholarly journals L’invalidità del Safe Harbor Agreement

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabiana Accardo
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Safe Harbor ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Us ◽  
Data Protection Law ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

The purpose of this article is that to explain the impact of the landmark decision Schrems c. Data Protection Commissioner [Ireland] - delivered on 7 October 2015 (Case C-362/2014 EU) by the Court of Justice - on the European scenario. Starting from a brief analysis of the major outcomes originated from the pronunciation of the Court of Justice, then it tries to study the level of criticality that the Safe Harbor Agreement and the subsequently adequacy Commission decision 2000/520/EC – that has been invalidated with Schrems judgment – have provoked before this pronunciation on the matter of safeguarding personal privacy of european citizens when their personal data are transferred outside the European Union, in particular the reference is at the US context. Moreover it focuses on the most important aspects of the new EU-US agreement called Privacy Shield: it can be really considered the safer solution for data sharing in the light of the closer implementation of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679, which will take the place of the Directive 95 /46/CE on the EU data protection law?

scholarly journals Pojęcie współmałżonka w prawie unijnym – uwagi na tle orzeczenia w sprawie Coman (C‑673/16)

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Ewa Kamarad
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

The Term ‘Spouse’ in EU Law – Comments on the Judgment in the Coman Case (C‑ 673‑16) The paper concerns the judgment of 5 June 2018 issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Coman case (C‑673‑16), in which the Court for the first time defined the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. It discusses the consequences of the judgement and its relation to the traditional mechanisms of private international law and the EU principle of mutual recognition.

scholarly journals Multilingualism as a Principle of the EU Court of Justice

2014 ◽  
pp. 245-252
Author(s):  
K. Kh. Rekosh
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Discourse Relations ◽  
Official Languages ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

Since the jurisprudence reflects relations between the institutions, bodies and organizations of the EU and native speakers, the EU Court of Justice plays a huge role in shaping the legal discourse. Relations between the EU and citizens show the effectiveness of the principle of multilingualism, that is apparent before the Court. The enlargement of the Union to 28 member States and, accordingly, the increase of the number of official languages to 24 complicate the implementation of the principle of multilingualism and create many problems for the EU Court of Justice: legal, linguistic, budget, translation. All documents of the Court are not translated into 24 EU official languages completely and often limited to summaries. All documents are translated only into French and proceeding languages, for the scale of the translation work have a direct impact on the timing of legal proceedings. To provide help in written translations, much work is carried out in the Court on drawing up dictionaries, thesauri, where multilingualism is fully manifested. On the use of languages and language regime, There is an extensive legal practice, however, the term «multilingualism» is not used by the Court, despite the recognition of the principle of equality of all official languages, perhaps, due to the fact that the Court itself not always follows it. The article shows that multilingualism as a legal concept and principle opens up, sometimes adjacent to the already distinguished objects of regulation, new areas of legal research. Comparison of legal solutions to the problems of multilingualism in different states with a variety of languages, law and order, or in international organizations, lays basis of "comparative linguistic law" Now in the doctrine of law of the European Union neither the linguistic law, nor the comparative linguistic law do not exist, but to provide cooperation in the field of justice and mutual recognition of judicial decisions on the basis of the principle of multilingualism, the EU has adopted the Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in the framework of criminal proceedings.

Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental Employment Rights in the European Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleni Frantziou
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Advocate General ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
Employment Rights ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

On 15 January 2014, the Court of Justice (hereafter ‘the Court’) delivered its judgment in Association de Médiation Sociale (hereafter ‘AMS’). AMS brought for the first time before the Court the issue of horizontal applicability in relation to a provision of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter ‘Charter’), namely Article 27 thereof, which enshrines the right of workers to information and consultation within the undertaking. The case therefore raised questions of ‘undeniable constitutional significance’, as Advocate-General Cruz Villalón had put it in his Opinion, regarding the post-Lisbon enforcement and interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, its application to disputes between private parties.

scholarly journals Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 779-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe concept of the essence of a fundamental right—set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”)—operates as a constant reminder that our core values as Europeans are absolute. In other words, they are not up for balancing. As the seminal judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) in Schrems shows, where a measure imposes a limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right that is so intense and so comprehensive that it calls into question that right as such, that measure is incompatible with the Charter, as it deprives the right at issue of its essence. This is so without the need for a balancing exercise of competing interests, because a measure that compromises the very essence of a fundamental right is automatically disproportionate. Therefore, the present contribution supports the contention that in order for the concept of essence to function in a constitutionally meaningful way, both EU and national courts should apply the “respect-for-the-essence test” before undertaking a proportionality assessment.

‘Different faces of dignity’: A functionalist account of the institutional use of the concept of dignity in the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 792-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davor Petrić
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Institutional Contexts ◽  
Functionalist Account ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
The Eu

The article provides a functionalist account of the ‘institutional uses’ of (human) dignity in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It looks at how the legal concept of dignity is invoked and used in the adjudication processes in the European Union, what is its role, and what are its practical effects. The aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the dignity’s functional roles in the EU, but also of the functional similarities and differences in comparison with other European jurisdictions. This will further show in what aspects dignity is independent of or dependent on institutional contexts in which it operates, especially regarding the judicial practices and mutual relationships between different courts.

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