Applications to Political Science

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Threshold Level ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Special Case

This chapter considers a set of closely related binary-choice games that have been applied to model questions in political science. It starts with an analysis of “participation games,” which are n-player games where each player has only two possible actions: to participate or not. The payoff for either decision depends on the number of other players who make that decision. In some cases, a threshold level of participation is required for the group benefit to be obtained. The first example is the “volunteer's dilemma,” which pertains to the special case where the threshold is 1, that is, only a single volunteer is needed. The chapter ends with an analysis of bargaining situations, including an application of agent quantal response equilibrium to bilateral “crisis bargaining” and of Markov QRE to the Baron–Ferejohn model of multilateral “legislative bargaining.”

scholarly journals Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions

2021 ◽  
Vol 288 (1962) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Lindig-León ◽  
Gerrit Schmid ◽  
Daniel A. Braun
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Nash Solution ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Sensorimotor Interactions ◽  
The Nash Solution ◽  
Special Case ◽  
General Tool

The Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts to study strategic interactions between multiple players and has recently also been shown to capture sensorimotor interactions between players that are haptically coupled. While previous studies in behavioural economics have shown that systematic deviations from Nash equilibria in economic decision-making can be explained by the more general quantal response equilibria, such deviations have not been reported for the sensorimotor domain. Here we investigate haptically coupled dyads across three different sensorimotor games corresponding to the classic symmetric and asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma, where the quantal response equilibrium predicts characteristic shifts across the three games, although the Nash equilibrium stays the same. We find that subjects exhibit the predicted deviations from the Nash solution. Furthermore, we show that taking into account subjects' priors for the games, we arrive at a more accurate description of bounded rational response equilibria that can be regarded as a quantal response equilibrium with non-uniform prior. Our results suggest that bounded rational response equilibria provide a general tool to explain sensorimotor interactions that include the Nash equilibrium as a special case in the absence of information processing limitations.

UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 407-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUIBIN YAN
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Uniqueness Results ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Special Case

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? This paper investigates a random-proposer model first studied in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for symmetric and convex characteristic functions, considerably expanding the conditions under which this model is known to exhibit SSPE payoff uniqueness. Our model includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.

Heterogeneity

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Error Rates ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Apparent Reason ◽  
Chess Players

Players have different skills, which has implications for the degree to which they make errors. Low-skill hitters in baseball often swing at bad pitches, beginning skiers frequently fall for no apparent reason, and children often lose at tic-tac-toe. At the other extreme, there are brilliant chess players, bargainers, and litigators who seem to know exactly what move to make or offer to decline. From a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) perspective, these skill levels can be modeled in terms of variation in error rates or in responsiveness of quantal response functions. This chapter explores issues related to individual heterogeneity with respect to player error rates. It also describes some extensions of QRE that relax the assumption that player expectations about the choice behavior of other players are correct. For example, in games that are played only once, players are not able to learn from others' prior decisions, and expectations must be based on introspection. The chapter develops the implications of noisy introspection embedded in a model of iterated thinking.

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

scholarly journals Cybersecurity Analysis of Smart Manufacturing System Using Game Theory Approach and Quantal Response Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 1001-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alireza Zarreh ◽  
Can Saygin ◽  
HungDa Wan ◽  
Yooneun Lee ◽  
Alejandro Bracho ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Manufacturing System ◽  
Smart Manufacturing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium
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