Compensation Disclosures and Corporate Governance through Shareholder Voting

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa ◽  
Xiaoxia Peng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Voting

Compensation Disclosures and Corporate Governance through Shareholder Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa ◽  
Xiaoxia Peng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
The Public ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in corporate governance. We find that CEO equity compensation expense, a distinct measure of equity compensation, is a determinant of shareholder voting for management sponsored equity plans and voting for directors that serve on the compensation committee. After controlling for ISS recommendations, we find that voting outcomes remain significantly related to abnormal equity compensation expense. Consistent with shareholders considering the equity compensation expense, we document that firms shorten equity compensation vesting periods when they are no longer required to disclose the equity compensation expense. Our findings suggest that shareholders rely on multiple, distinct measures of equity compensation when participating in corporate governance. JEL Classifications: M12; M52; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Iliev ◽  
Karl V. Lins ◽  
Darius P. Miller ◽  
Lukas Roth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
The World

scholarly journals Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 2167-2202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Iliev ◽  
Karl V. Lins ◽  
Darius P. Miller ◽  
Lukas Roth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
The World

Shareholder Votes on Auditor Ratification and Subsequent Auditor Dismissals

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhijit Barua ◽  
K Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Advisory Committee ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Auditor Selection ◽  
The U.S

SYNPOSIS The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP [DoT 2008]), appointed by the U.S. Department of Treasury, recommended that regulators require public companies to have shareholder voting on auditor ratification. However, the SEC has sided with companies that sought to exclude proposals from shareholders seeking greater say in the auditor selection process. We use data from 12,664 shareholder votes on auditor ratification during 2011–2014 and find that subsequent auditor dismissals become more likely with increases in the proportion of shareholders not ratifying the auditor. The findings should be of interest to corporate governance activists and regulators, and reinforce suggestions that even small changes in shareholder votes can be associated with significant corporate changes.

PCAOB Inspection Reports and Shareholder Ratification of the Auditor

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myungsoo Son ◽  
Hakjoon Song ◽  
Youngkyun Park
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Auditor Quality

ABSTRACT We examine the effect of unfavorable PCAOB inspection reports, which contain audit deficiencies related to GAAS and/or GAAP violations, on shareholder voting for the auditor ratification. We further investigate whether shareholders likely vote against ratification for the auditors receiving deficiency reports in a weak corporate governance environment. Overall, we do not find evidence that shareholders vote against auditor ratifications when their auditors receive unfavorable inspection reports. However, we find some evidence that shareholders cast their votes against the ratifications of auditors receiving unfavorable inspection reports when the corporate governance is weak, as proxied by CEO duality and a low level of board diligence. Our results suggest that shareholders seem not to incorporate inspection reports as a potential proxy for auditor quality in their vote decisions on auditor ratification. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals Research on the Application of Blockchain Technology in the Field of Corporate Governance

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 01064
Author(s):  
Liyuan Meng ◽  
Shaodong Xing
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Technology ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Annual General ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Annual General Meeting ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
The Cost

The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders is considered to be a boring and mandatory annual ceremony. At present, its information, forum, decision-making functions, and voting procedures are all flawed. As a new technology, the introduction of blockchain can greatly reduce the cost of shareholder voting and company organization costs, improve the company’s decision-making efficiency and the transparency of voting and elections, and effectively solve the problems existing in the current annual general meeting of shareholders. The research in this paper provides an intelligent solution for the traditional inefficiency of corporate governance.

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