The effect of cash versus equity compensation on audit committee decision-making - evidence from the 2007 Deloitte censure

Purpose This study aims to investigate the effect of cash versus equity compensation on audit committee decision-making after the Public Companies Oversight Board’s 2007 censure of Deloitte. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 2,588 firms, this paper uses two different compensation measurements to empirically examine the effect of audit committee compensation on decision-making. Findings The authors find that audit committee compensation effects the post-censure decision-making of Deloitte’s clients. The results support the hypothesis that cash compensation paid to audit committees influences audit committee members to retain their auditors post-censure. Additionally, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that equity compensation increases the propensity to switch auditors post-censure. Practical implications This study will be of interest to regulators, policymakers and researchers as it provides further evidence in the area of audit committee decision-making and the effect of cash and stock compensation paid to audit committee members. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence of the association between audit committee compensation and audit committee decision-making by investigating the effect of cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation on audit committee decision-making.

Director Compensation in the Banking Industry Around the Dodd-Frank Act

Directors’ monitoring and advising activities as agents were supposed to increase after the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act significantly increases the pressure on the board of directors to be more effective agents of the stockholders even after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) became effective. Director compensation, especially incentive-based compensation, is intended to align with the interests of shareholders and motivate director behavior. This paper empirically tests how banks respond to the Dodd-Frank Act by redesigning their director compensation plans. Our findings suggest that banks recognize the need for improved board monitoring by highlighting the importance of director workload and qualifications through the design of director compensation packages in the post-Dodd-Frank Act period. We also find that the negative impact of excessive director equity compensation on firm performance was attenuated after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. The findings of this study shed light on the rationale of director compensation policies for banking firms.

Diversity Matters: A Study on the Relationship between Board Career Diversity and Firm Performance

Are shareholders better off hiring directors with in-depth specialties in the company’s core business or hiring directors with broader perspectives? This study addresses the question by investigating the relationship between directors’ career diversity and firm performance. It employs Tobin’s Q, total shareholder return, and return on equity as measures of firm performance. Accordingly, board career diversity has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. Moreover, we find that board directors with diverse industry experiences create value for firms via advisory (e.g., R&D and capital expenditures) and monitoring (e.g., equity compensation) roles. Given that diversity in career matters, corporations can seriously consider board composition and promote career diversity among board members.

Whose cash compensation has more influence on real earnings management, CEOs or CFOs?

PurposeScholars have investigated the association between executives' incentives and earnings management. Most of the extant literature focuses on equity executives' incentives, while most of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual earnings management (AEM), not real earnings management (REM). This paper investigates the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) and chief financial officer (CFOs) cash compensation and REM and explores who has more influence on REM, the CEO or the CFO.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the data of all listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from 2009 to 2017 and ordinary least squares regression as a baseline model and the Chow test to capture whether the CEO's or the CFO's cash compensation has more influence on REM. To address potential endogeneity issues, the authors use a firm-fixed effect technique and two-stage least squares regression.FindingsThe authors find that CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation is significantly associated with REM, suggesting that paying non-equity compensation to the CEO and CFO is negatively associated with REM. The authors also find that the CFO's cash compensation has a more significant influence on REM than the CEO's cash compensation, suggesting that the CFO's accounting and financial knowledge strengthens his or her power on the quality of financial reporting.Practical implicationsThe study contributes to the literature of agency and contract theories by using cash-based compensation to provide strong evidence that CEO's and CFO's compensation is associated with REM. It also contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the effect of CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation on earnings management using proxies for REM-related activities. The study also contributes to the institutional theory by providing empirical evidence on the governance role of executives' cash compensation in deterring REM. Finally, it is the first to examine the relationship between CEO's and CFO's cash compensation and REM, and the first to explore who is more influential regarding REM in emerging markets, the CEO or the CFO.Originality/valueAs a response to the call for investigations of the role of non-equity-based compensation in earnings management and the call to consider non-developed institutional contexts in governance research, this study extends prior studies by providing novel evidence on the relationship between CEOs' and CFOs' non-equity compensation and REM in China's emerging market. The study documents that the CFO has a greater influence on REM than the CEO does.

Equity, Compensation, and Costs

Just as equitable considerations can inform a court or tribunal’s decision in the early phases of the adjudicatory process, so equity may have a role to play in fixing the amount of compensation, in allocating costs, and in deciding whether to grant security for costs. The chapter proceeds in two parts. First, it considers equity in the reasoning of international courts and tribunals leading to the award of compensation. Second, it studies the role of equity in decisions relating to costs in investment arbitration – notably in decisions on the apportionment of costs between the disputing parties and on security for costs, a provisional measure in whose application equitable considerations are noticeably prominent.

Real Effects of Financial Reporting on Innovation: Evidence from Tax Law and Accounting Standards

This study examines whether financial accounting standards moderate the effectiveness of tax policy. Specifically, we examine whether myopic managers' focus on short-term financial reporting reduces the effectiveness of tax subsidies that incentivize innovation. We employ a novel setting, the issuance of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), which changed the financial reporting for some important, yet uncertain, tax incentives to innovate. For firms most affected by the standard change, we find evidence of reduced investment in innovation, reduced sensitivity of investment to tax incentives, and reduced future innovative output. Consistent with earnings myopia, we find the effect is more pronounced in firms with higher levels of transient institutional ownership and newly vesting equity compensation. These results indicate financial reporting myopia has real effects on innovation and can reduce tax policy effectiveness. The results further suggest that tax policymakers should consider both financial reporting and cash flow incentives in designing policy.