scholarly journals Who Benefits from a Bull Market? An Analysis of Employee Stock Option Grants and Stock Prices

Author(s):  
Nellie Liang ◽  
Scott J. Weisbenner
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 971-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy B. Bell ◽  
Wayne R. Landsman ◽  
Bruce L. Miller ◽  
Shu Yeh

We use the Ohlson (1995, 1999) and Feltham and Ohlson (1999) valuation models to investigate the market's perception of the economic effect of employee stock options (ESOs) on firm value for a sample of 85 profitable computer software companies. Our results suggest that the market appears to value these firms' ESO expense not as an expense but as an intangible asset (even after controlling for the endogeneity bias arising from the mechanical relation between ESOs and the underlying stock prices). However, we also find a conflict between: (1) the positive manner in which investors appear to value ESO expense, and (2) the negative relation between current ESO expense and future abnormal earnings. This conflict not only could be an artifact of the restrictiveness of the abnormal earnings forecasting equation we estimate, but it also calls into question whether investors assess correctly the effect of ESOs on profitable software firm value.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. McMillan ◽  
Manouchehr Tavakoli ◽  
Phillip J. McKnight

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dahlia Robinson ◽  
Diane Burton

This paper investigates the market reaction to announcements by firms of their decision to adopt the fair value provisions of SFAS No. 123 in accounting for their employee stock option (ESO) expense. Additionally, this paper examines ESO usage and expense of adopting firms and compares the impact of the expense on profitability measures for adopting firms relative to a matched set of control firms. We find a positive and significant abnormal return in the three days around the adoption announcements, suggesting that the decision to expense using the fair value method is value relevant. The positive abnormal announcement returns are mainly attributable to the earlier announcements, consistent with early announcements serving as a credible signal of a commitment to transparency in financial reporting. We find evidence that in the three years prior to the announcement year, adopting firms report significantly higher earnings than control firms yet fail to earn higher market returns, suggesting that adopters stand to benefit the most by improving the market's perception of their accounting reports. We also find that ESO usage, ESO expense, and the impact of ESO expense on profitability are significantly lower for adopters relative to control firms, although the impact of ESO expense is economically significant for 43 percent of the adopters.


2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard C. Soffer

One of the cornerstones of financial statement analysis is the discounted cash flow valuation. Despite the broad use of this valuation technique, and the economic importance of employee stock options to firm values, there is little guidance on how employee stock options should be incorporated in a valuation. This paper provides a comprehensive approach to doing so, including consideration of the income tax implications of option exercises, the simultaneity of equity and option valuation, and the use of the disclosures that were mandated recently by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123. The paper provides a comprehensive example using Microsoft's fiscal 1997 financial statements and employee stock option disclosure. This paper should be of interest to academics and practitioners involved in corporate valuation and financial statement analysis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 1440003
Author(s):  
CHII-SHYAN KUO ◽  
SHIH-TI YU

We examine whether and how firm characteristics, including firm size and liquidity, affect the relation between employee stock option (ESO) grants (as proxied by disclosed ESO expenses) and firm value. We also investigate how the implementation of a new share-based compensation recognition rule affects the pricing effect of ESOs. Prior studies have provided mixed results concerning how ESOs affect firm value. We argue that their findings could be attributable to self-selection and a non-uniform ESO-share price relation. We use the threshold model to address our research questions after controlling for self-selection bias. We find that markets tend to positively price ESOs in the case of firms characterized by large size and low liquidity. In addition, we find that after the new rule came into effect, ESOs became positively associated with firm value. These results are congruent with ownership and symbolic value theories, the lifecycle stages hypothesis and the contention that an ESO expensing policy enhances the quality of financial statements.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nur Fadjrih Asyik

This study aims to test whether the management that receive compensation in the form of stock options having an positive impact on company performance. This study considers the external performance measurement by identifying Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). In addition, this study aims to test whether the company's capital structure affects the sensitivity level of employee stock option compensation and firm performance. Capital structure is measured with debt to equity ratio. The result indicates that the proportion of Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) influence company performance in accordance with the predictions. This shows that the more stock options offered to employees then came a sense of belonging which resulted in more motivated managers to improve company performance. Furthermore, the higher the market performance of companies that can be achieved, the higher the profit (gain) will be obtained by the recipient of stock options. In addition, this study also shows that the impact of stock option grants at the company's performance declined with the greater capital structure of liability. This shows that the capital structure of liabilities will lower the sensitivity level of employee stock option compensation and firm performance. The higher the company's liabilities would reduce the rights of the owner of the dividends each period in accordance with the ownership of shares held since the company must take into account the interest costs to be paid to the creditor.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Usman ◽  
Shufang Xiao ◽  
Weiwei Li

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