scholarly journals Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago

Author(s):  
Battal Dogan ◽  
M. Bumin Yenmez

Author(s):  
Isa Emin Hafalir ◽  
Fuhito Kojima ◽  
M. Bumin Yenmez


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umut Dur ◽  
Robert G. Hammond ◽  
Thayer Morrill

An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of which students rank schools following their true preference order (sincere students) and which rank schools by manipulating their true preferences (sophisticated students). We present evidence that our proxy for sophistication captures systematic differences among students. Our results demonstrate that sophisticated students are 9.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned to one of their preferred schools. Further, we show that this large difference in assignment probability occurs because sophisticated students systematically avoid over-demanded schools. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28)



2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.









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