scholarly journals Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umut Dur ◽  
Robert G. Hammond ◽  
Thayer Morrill
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Preference Order ◽  
Direct Measure ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Student Assignment ◽  
True Preference ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Assignment Probability ◽  
True Preferences

An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of which students rank schools following their true preference order (sincere students) and which rank schools by manipulating their true preferences (sophisticated students). We present evidence that our proxy for sophistication captures systematic differences among students. Our results demonstrate that sophisticated students are 9.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned to one of their preferred schools. Further, we show that this large difference in assignment probability occurs because sophisticated students systematically avoid over-demanded schools. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28)

scholarly journals Manipulating Gale-Shapley Algorithm: Preserving Stability and Remaining Inconspicuous

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohit Vaish ◽  
Dinesh Garg
Keyword(s):  
Stability Result ◽  
Single Woman ◽  
Preference List ◽  
True Preference ◽  
The Stability ◽  
True Preferences

We study the problem of manipulation of the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm by a single woman via permutation of her true preference list. Our contribution is threefold: First, we show that the matching induced by an optimal manipulation is stable with respect to the true preferences. Second, we identify a class of optimal manipulations called inconspicuous manipulations which, in addition to preserving stability, are also nearly identical to the true preference list of the manipulator (making the manipulation hard to be detected). Third, for optimal inconspicuous manipulations, we strengthen the stability result by showing that the entire stable lattice of the manipulated instance is contained inside the original lattice.​

scholarly journals Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isa Emin Hafalir ◽  
Fuhito Kojima ◽  
M. Bumin Yenmez
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Student Assignment

scholarly journals Win or Lose: Residential Sorting After a School Choice Lottery

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-472
Author(s):  
Andrew Bibler ◽  
Stephen B. Billings
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Housing Price ◽  
Sixth Graders ◽  
Neighborhood Schools ◽  
The Public ◽  
Opting Out ◽  
Land Prices ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Residential Sorting ◽  
Average School

We examine residential relocation and opting out of the public school system in response to school choice lottery outcomes. We show that rising kindergartners and sixth graders who lose a school choice lottery are 6 percentage points more likely to exit the district or change neighborhood schools (20% to 30% increase) and make up 0.14 to 0.35 standard deviations in average school test scores between lottery assignment and attendance the following year. Using hedonic-based estimates of land prices, we estimate that lottery losers pay a 9% to 11% housing price premium for access to a school with a 1 standard deviation higher mean test score.

scholarly journals Misunderstanding the Match: Do Students Create Rank Lists Based on True Preferences?

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-7
Author(s):  
Benjamin Schnapp ◽  
Kathleen Ulrich ◽  
Jamie Hess ◽  
Aaron Kraut ◽  
David Tillman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Online Survey ◽  
External Information ◽  
Stable Marriage ◽  
School Students ◽  
Moderate Amount ◽  
Optimal Outcomes ◽  
Match Algorithm ◽  
True Preference ◽  
Rank List ◽  
True Preferences

Introduction: The “stable marriage” algorithm underlying the National Residency Match Program (NRMP) has been shown to create optimal outcomes when students submit true preference lists. Previous research has shown students may allow external information to affect their rank lists. The objective of this study was to determine whether medical students consistently make rank lists that reflect their true preferences. Methods: A voluntary online survey was sent to third-year students at a single midwestern medical school. Students were given hypothetical scenarios that either should or should not affect their true residency preferences and rated the importance of six factors to their final rank list. The survey was edited by a group of education scholars and revised based on feedback from a pilot with current postgraduate year 1 residents. Results: Of 175 students surveyed, 140 (80%) responded; 63% (88/140) reported that their “perceived competitiveness” would influence their rank list at least a “moderate amount. Of 135 students, 31 (23%) moved a program lower on their list if they learned they were ranked “low” by that program, while 6% (8/135) of respondents moved a program higher if they learned they were ranked “at the top of the list.” Participants responded similarly (κ = 0.71) when presented with scenarios asking what they would do vs what a classmate should do. Conclusion: Students’ hypothetical rank lists did not consistently match their true residency preferences. These results may stem from a misunderstanding of the Match algorithm. Medical schools should consider augmenting explicit education related to the NRMP Match algorithm to ensure optimal outcomes for students.

scholarly journals Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Battal Dogan ◽  
M. Bumin Yenmez
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Student Assignment

scholarly journals School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Design Approach ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Practical Solution ◽  
Student Assignment ◽  
Education Literature

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.

A Quick Visual Mind Can be a Slow Auditory Mind

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sander Martens ◽  
Addie Johnson ◽  
Martje Bolle ◽  
Jelmer Borst
Keyword(s):  
Attentional Blink ◽  
Task Difficulty ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Visual Modality ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Conscious Level ◽  
Visual Targets ◽  
Concurrent Information

The human mind is severely limited in processing concurrent information at a conscious level of awareness. These temporal restrictions are clearly reflected in the attentional blink (AB), a deficit in reporting the second of two targets when it occurs 200–500 ms after the first. However, we recently reported that some individuals do not show a visual AB, and presented psychophysiological evidence that target processing differs between “blinkers” and “nonblinkers”. Here, we present evidence that visual nonblinkers do show an auditory AB, which suggests that a major source of attentional restriction as reflected in the AB is likely to be modality-specific. In Experiment 3, we show that when the difficulty in identifying visual targets is increased, nonblinkers continue to show little or no visual AB, suggesting that the presence of an AB in the auditory but not in the visual modality is not due to a difference in task difficulty.

Paige Issues Statement on D.C. School Choice Legislation

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
School Choice

School Choice for Student Success

2013 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Student Success
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