A Comparative Analysis of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria and the Troubled Asset Relief Program of the United States

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinenyeze Junior Amaechi ◽  
Ozioma Mary Amaechi ◽  
Folashade Adeyemo
Author(s):  
V. Iordanova ◽  
A. Ananev

The authors of this scientific article conducted a comparative analysis of the trade policy of US presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The article states that the tightening of trade policy by the current President is counterproductive and has a serious impact not only on the economic development of the United States, but also on the entire world economy as a whole.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Matias López ◽  
Juan Pablo Luna

ABSTRACT By replying to Kurt Weyland’s (2020) comparative study of populism, we revisit optimistic perspectives on the health of American democracy in light of existing evidence. Relying on a set-theoretical approach, Weyland concludes that populists succeed in subverting democracy only when institutional weakness and conjunctural misfortune are observed jointly in a polity, thereby conferring on the United States immunity to democratic reversal. We challenge this conclusion on two grounds. First, we argue that the focus on institutional dynamics neglects the impact of the structural conditions in which institutions are embedded, such as inequality, racial cleavages, and changing political attitudes among the public. Second, we claim that endogeneity, coding errors, and the (mis)use of Boolean algebra raise questions about the accuracy of the analysis and its conclusions. Although we are skeptical of crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis as an adequate modeling choice, we replicate the original analysis and find that the paths toward democratic backsliding and continuity are both potentially compatible with the United States.


Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vuk Vukovic

AbstractIn 2008, as the financial crisis unfolded in the United States, the banking industry elevated its lobbying and campaign spending activities. By the end of 2008, and during 2009, the biggest political spenders, on average, received the largest bailout packages. Is that relationship causal? In this paper, I examine the effect of political connections on the allocation of funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to the US financial services industry during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. I find that TARP recipients that lobbied the government, donated to political campaigns, or whose top executives had direct connections to politics received better bailout deals. I estimate regression discontinuity design and instrumental variable models to uncover how election outcomes for politicians in close races affected the distribution of bailout funds for connected firms. The results do not imply that some banks were deliberately favored over others, just that favored banks benefited because of their proximity to the right people in power. If being politically connected matters in general, in times of crisis it matters even more.


1993 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 347
Author(s):  
Geoff Evans ◽  
Melvin L. Kohn ◽  
Kazimierz M. Slomcynski

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document