Informational Advantage in US Treasury Auctions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Tchuindjo
Keyword(s):  
Treasury Auctions ◽  
Informational Advantage

scholarly journals Return and Maturity Relationships for Treasury Auctions: Evidence from Turkey

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakan Berument ◽  
Eray M. Yucel
Keyword(s):  
Treasury Auctions

Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (8) ◽  
pp. 2431-2465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonce Bargeron ◽  
Alice Bonaime
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Trading Strategy ◽  
Short Sellers ◽  
Managerial Myopia ◽  
Agency Issues ◽  
Target Management ◽  
Short Interest ◽  
Short Termism ◽  
Informational Advantage

Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.

scholarly journals Advocatus, et non Latro? Testing the Excess of Litigation in the Italian Courts of Justice

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Buonanno ◽  
Matteo M. Galizzi
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Sharp Increase ◽  
Civil Litigation ◽  
Induced Demand ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Causality Relationship ◽  
Informational Advantage

AbstractWe explore the causality relationship between litigation rates and the number of lawyers, drawing on an original panel dataset for the 169 Italian first-instance courts of justice between 2000 and 2007. In this time period, both the number of lawyers and the civil litigation rate sharply increased, and a mandatory minimum fee was in place for lawyers’ services. We first document that the number of lawyers is positively correlated with different measures of the litigation rate. Then, using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that a 10% increase in lawyers over population is associated with an increase between 1.6 and 6% in civil litigation rates. Our empirical analysis supports the supplier-induced demand (SID) hypothesis for Italian lawyers: following a sharp increase in the number of lawyers, and in the impossibility of competing on price because of the minimum fee regulation, some lawyers may have opportunistically used their informational advantage to induce their clients to bring lawsuits into court more often than would have been optimal if they were acting in the exclusive interest of their clients.

scholarly journals Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions

2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 1865-1902 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTI KELOHARJU ◽  
KJELL G. NYBORG ◽  
KRISTIAN RYDQVIST
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Treasury Auctions

Do Analysts Gain an Informational Advantage by Visiting Listed Companies?

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 1843-1867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Dongmin Kong ◽  
Shasha Liu
Keyword(s):  
Listed Companies ◽  
Informational Advantage

scholarly journals Entry Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Sarmento ◽  
António Brandão
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Entry Regulation ◽  
Incumbent Firm ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Pooling Equilibrium ◽  
Insufficient Entry ◽  
Final Effect ◽  
Informational Advantage

We investigate how an incumbent firm can use the regulatory policy about entry and the informational advantage to protect his market position. This question is studied through the construction of a signalling game where we assume that the regulator has less information about demand than the firms. We conclude that there is a pooling equilibrium and partially separating equilibria in which entry is deterred and, if demand is high, there will be insufficient entry. The final effect on welfare depends on the tradeoff between short-run benefits (lower price) and long-run losses (weaker competition).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document