Can Investment Incentives Crowd Out Innovation? Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaowei Ke ◽  
Yao Lu ◽  
Xinzheng Shi ◽  
Yeqing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Investment Incentives ◽  
Crowd Out

Human Capital Accumulation and Resource Abundance

2011 ◽  
pp. 66-77
Author(s):  
O. Vasilieva
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Harmful Effect ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Resource Abundance ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Crowd Out

Does resource abundance positively affect human capital accumulation? Or, alternatively, does it «crowd out» the human capital leading to the deterioration of economic growth? The paper gives an overview of the relevant literature and discusses both theoretical and empirical results obtained regarding the connection between human capital accumulation and resource abundance. It shows that despite some theoretical predictions about the harmful effect of resource abundance on human capital accumulation, unambiguous evidence of such impact that would be robust with respect to the change of resource abundance parameter has not been obtained yet.

Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Akbarpour ◽  
Scott Duke Kominers ◽  
Shengwu Li ◽  
Paul R. Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Investment Incentives

The Propaganda Feedback Loop

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yochai Benkler ◽  
Robert Faris ◽  
Hal Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hillary Clinton ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
The Public ◽  
False Reporting ◽  
Media Ecosystem ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter presents a model of the interaction of media outlets, politicians, and the public with an emphasis on the tension between truth-seeking and narratives that confirm partisan identities. This model is used to describe the emergence and mechanics of an insular media ecosystem and how two fundamentally different media ecosystems can coexist. In one, false narratives that reinforce partisan identity not only flourish, but crowd-out true narratives even when these are presented by leading insiders. In the other, false narratives are tested, confronted, and contained by diverse outlets and actors operating in a truth-oriented norms dynamic. Two case studies are analyzed: the first focuses on false reporting on a selection of television networks; the second looks at parallel but politically divergent false rumors—an allegation that Donald Trump raped a 13-yearold and allegations tying Hillary Clinton to pedophilia—and tracks the amplification and resistance these stories faced.

Price and subsidy under uncertainty: Real-option approach to optimal investment decisions on energy storage with solar PV

2021 ◽  
pp. 0958305X2199229
Author(s):  
Jingyu Qu ◽  
Wooyoung Jeon
Keyword(s):  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Energy Storage ◽  
Real Option ◽  
Financial Burden ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Investment Incentives ◽  
Solar Pv ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Trigger Price

Renewable generation sources still have not achieved economic validity in many countries including Korea, and require subsidies to support the transition to a low-carbon economy. An initial Feed-In Tariff (FIT) was adopted to support the deployment of renewable energy in Korea until 2011 and then was switched to the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to implement more market-oriented mechanisms. However, high volatilities in electricity prices and subsidies under the RPS scheme have weakened investment incentives. In this study we estimate how the multiple price volatilities under the RPS scheme affect the optimal investment decisions of energy storage projects, whose importance is increasing rapidly because they can mitigate the variability and uncertainty of solar and wind generation in the power system. We applied mathematical analysis based on real-option methods to estimate the optimal trigger price for investment in energy-storage projects with and without multiple price volatilities. We found that the optimal trigger price of subsidy called the Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) under multiple price volatilities is 10.5% higher than that under no price volatilities. If the volatility of the REC price gets doubled, the project requires a 26.6% higher optimal investment price to justify the investment against the increased risk. In the end, we propose an auction scheme that has the advantage of both RPS and FIT in order to minimize the financial burden of the subsidy program by eliminating subsidy volatility and find the minimum willingness-to-accept price for investors.

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