scholarly journals Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Currency Unions

scholarly journals International Risk Sharing and Currency Unions: The Cfa Zones

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne Baba Yehoue
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Currency Unions ◽  
International Risk Sharing

scholarly journals International Risk Sharing and Currency Unions: The CFA Zones

2005 ◽  
Vol 05 (95) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne B. Yehoue ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Currency Unions ◽  
International Risk Sharing

scholarly journals Risk Sharing in Currency Unions: The Migration Channel

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilhelm K. Kohler ◽  
Gernot J. Müller ◽  
Susanne Wellmann
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Currency Unions

scholarly journals International risk-sharing and currency unions: The CFA zones

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (7) ◽  
pp. 936-958 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne B. Yehoue
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Currency Unions ◽  
International Risk Sharing

scholarly journals Fiscal Unions

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (12) ◽  
pp. 3788-3834 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Farhi ◽  
Iván Werning
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Capital Controls ◽  
Currency Union ◽  
Country Risk ◽  
Currency Unions ◽  
Fiscal Union ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Optimal Risk Sharing

We study cross-country risk sharing as a second-best problem for members of a currency union using an open economy model with nominal rigidities and provide two key results. First, we show that if financial markets are incomplete, the value of gaining access to any given level of aggregate risk sharing is greater for countries that are members of a currency union. Second, we show that even if financial markets are complete, privately optimal risk sharing is constrained inefficient. A role emerges for government intervention in risk sharing both to guarantee its existence and to influence its operation. The constrained efficient risk-sharing arrangement can be implemented by contingent transfers within a fiscal union. We find that the benefits of such a fiscal union are larger, the more asymmetric the shocks affecting the members of the currency union, the more persistent these shocks, and the less open the member economies. Finally, we compare the performance of fiscal unions and of other macroeconomic stabilization instruments available in currency unions such as capital controls, government spending, fiscal deficits, and redistribution. (JEL E62, F31, F32, F41, F45)

Culture and Risk Sharing Networks

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Laban
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing

Protecting All: Risk Sharing for a Diverse and Diversifying World of Work

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Truman Packard ◽  
Ugo Gentilini ◽  
Margaret Grosh ◽  
Philip O’Keefe ◽  
Robert Palacios ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing

Lending to the Borrower from Hell

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philip Ii ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intelligent Model ◽  
New Evidence

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.

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