Amendment thresholds and voting rules in debt contracts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judson Caskey ◽  
Kanyuan Huang ◽  
Daniel Saavedra
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Debt Contracts

European voting rules flawed

Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ball
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

A Political Economy Model of a Research University

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Research University ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Optimal Incentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Restrictiveness of Covenants Used in Private Debt Contracts

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Intan Suryani Abu Bakar ◽  
Paul R. Mather ◽  
George Tanewski
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Private Debt ◽  
The Impact

Optimal Two Stage Committee Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Committee Voting

The Relation between Accounting Information in Debt Covenants and Operating Leases

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 969-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gyung H. Paik ◽  
Joyce A. van der Laan Smith ◽  
Brandon Byunghwan Lee ◽  
Sung Wook Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Debt Contracting ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Operating Leases ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Accounting Ratios ◽  
Lease Accounting

SYNOPSIS Proposed changes by the FASB and the IASB to lease accounting standards will substantially change the accounting for operating leases by requiring the capitalization of future lease payments. We consider the impact of these changes on firms' debt covenants by examining the frequency of income-statement- versus balance-sheet-based accounting ratios in debt covenants of firms in high and low Off Balance Sheet (OBS) lease industries. Based on debt contracts from the 1996–2009 period, our results provide evidence that lenders focus on balance sheet (income statement) ratios in designing debt covenants for borrowers in low (high) OBS lease industries. Further, the use of balance-sheet- (income-statement-) based covenants falls (rises) faster in high OBS lease industries than in low OBS lease industries as the use of OBS leasing increases. This evidence indicates that OBS operating leases influence lenders' use of accounting information in covenants, suggesting that creditors consider the impact of OBS leases when structuring debt agreements. These results also suggest that the proposed capitalization of OBS leases may not result in firms violating loan covenants but will make the balance sheet a more complete source of information for debt contracting by removing the need for constructive capitalization of OBS leases.

scholarly journals Accuracy of Verdicts under Different Jury Sizes and Voting Rules

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 221-236
Author(s):  
Alice Guerra ◽  
Barbara Luppi ◽  
Francesco Parisi
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

scholarly journals Asset Specificity and the Secondary Market for Productive Assets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Boccaletti
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Productive Assets

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to explore how debt contracts are affected by investment in asset specialization and by the dynamics of the secondary market for collateralized productive assets. Before applying for a loan, financially constrained firms face a specificity trade-off: asset specialization increases firms’ project returns, but decreases the liquidation value of assets in the secondary market if the firm is in financial distress. To study this trade-off, the paper uses a theoretical model in which the choice of asset specificity and the outcome of the secondary market for distressed firms’ assets are endogenous. High redeployability costs and a small number of participants in the secondary market are associated to low recovery values and to a high cost of debt. The paper shows the conditions under which financial constraints reduce firms’ incentive to invest in asset specificity.

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