The impact of simultaneous holdings of equity and debt on financial covenants in debt contracts

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of non-commercial banking institutions’ simultaneous holdings of equity and debt in the same firm (hereafter, dual holdings) on financial covenants in debt contracts. Design/methodology/approach By using the DealScan database, this study tests how dual holdings affect the number of financial debt covenants. Findings This study finds that the presence of dual holders is positively associated with the number of financial covenants in general, suggesting that the use of financial covenants is reduced when the interests between shareholders and creditors are aligned. This study also finds that dual holder participation does not reduce the number of financial covenants in leveraged loans as much as it does in investment-grade loans. Additionally, when a dual holder has a large portion of equity stakes and loan claims in a borrowing firm, the effect of dual holdings on financial covenants is more pronounced. Originality/value This study contributes to debt market research by showing that dual holder participation reduces the number of financial covenants in debt contracts.

How Do Trading, Service, and Investment Sector Companies Make Transfer Pricing Decisions?

The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of bonus mechanisms, tunneling incentives, debt covenants, and sales growth on company decisions in transfer pricing practices. Trading, service, and investment companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2014-2018 were used as the research population. The sampling technique used a purposive sampling method with specific criteria so that the final sample of the study was 21 sample companies. The research analysis technique used multiple regression analysis techniques using the IBM SPSS 21 application. This study proved that the bonus mechanism and sales growth could not influence the company to choose to practice transfer pricing. Tunneling incentives have a positive and significant effect on the decision to practice transfer pricing. In contrast, debt covenants have a negative and significant impact on the decision to practice transfer pricing. This research concluded that bonus mechanisms and sales growth could not determine transfer pricing practice decisions, while tunneling incentives can influence companies in making decisions on transfer pricing practices. Debt covenant has a negative and significant effect on transfer pricing practice decisions. Future research may use other bonus mechanism measures, such as proxies for compensation. Subsequent studies can select company objects with a larger population, such as non-financial companies on the IDX.

Debt Covenants and Accounting Manipulation

This paper studies the effects of allocating control rights to lenders via debt covenants when managers can sometimes misreport the accounting information on which the covenants are based. When contract renegotiation is exogenously prohibited, including a covenant in the contract is ex ante optimal because it increases both the probability that poor projects are liquidated and the manager's effort incentive. When the parties can renegotiate the contract, the results can flip: Granting the lender more control can lead to less frequent liquidations of low-quality projects and lower managerial effort incentives and thereby reduce the manager's ex ante payoff. The key behind these results is not the manager's incentive to misreport per se but her desire to take subsequent actions that conceal the misreporting. The model generates predictions regarding the determinants of accounting-based covenants, and the effects of covenants on misreporting, managerial effort, the frequency of liquidations, and firm value.

The Role of Debt Covenant in Moderating the Effects of Poilitical Cost on Accounting Conservatism

The purpose of this study was to analyze the direct effect of political cost and debt covenant on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study also analyzes the role of debt covenants as a moderator between the effect of political cost on accounting conservatism. The companies that are the samples are companies indexed on the IDX30 other than financial services companies and companies with non-rupiah financial reports. the data used is secondary data from the financial statements of 20 companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. data analysis using multiple linear regression and analysis of variance. The results showed that political cost directly affects accounting conservatism positively and significantly. whereas debt covenant does not have a direct significant effect on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study shows the role of debt covenants in strengthening the effect of political costs on accounting conservatism.