Legal Proof: Foundherentism and Statistical Evidence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Wright
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss

This chapter applies probabilistic knowledge to problems in legal and moral philosophy. It is argued that legal standards of proof require factfinders to know probabilistic contents. For instance, proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires knowledge that the defendant is at least .5 likely to be liable, whereas proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires knowledge of a significantly stronger content. The fact that legal proof requires knowledge explains why merely statistical evidence is insufficient to license a legal verdict of liability or guilt. In addition to explaining the limited value of statistical evidence, probabilistic knowledge is useful in spelling out norms violated by acts of racial and other profiling. It can be epistemically wrong to infer from statistics that a woman is probably an administrative assistant, for instance, even when inferring facts about ordinary objects from similar statistics is perfectly okay.


Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Tim Smartt

Abstract In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical generalisation. In this paper, I show that Moss's account of legal proof crucially depends on a moral norm called the rule of consideration. I argue that we have a number of reasons to be sceptical of this rule. Once we reject the rule, it is not clear that Moss's account of legal proof is either plausible or attractive.


Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (516) ◽  
pp. 1269-1285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Di Bello

Abstract Smith (2018) argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Ross

A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked aconsiderable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base alegal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have consid-ered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of errorare extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories con-cerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compellingscenarios in which there are multiple sources of incriminating statistical evidence.As we conjoin together different types of statistical evidence, it becomes increas-ingly incredible to suppose that a positive verdict would be impermissible. I suggestthat none of the dominant views in the literature can easily accommodate suchcases, and close by offering a diagnosis of my own.


2017 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Anchishkina

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Syufaat Syufaat

Waqf has two dimensional meaning; the spiritual dimension that is taqarrub to Allah and the social dimension as the source of Islamic financial for the welfare of the people. Waqf disputes can be caused by several reasons; waqf land is not accompanied with a pledge; waqf is done on the basis of mutual trust so it has no legal proof and ownership. Currently, the choice to use the court is less effective in resolving disputes. Hence, the public ultimately chooses non-litigation efforts as a way to resolve the disputes. Mediation process is preferred by many as it is viewed to be the fairest way where none of the two parties wins or loses (win-win solution). It is also fast and cheap. This study is intended to examine how to solve waqf dispute with mediation model according to the waqf law, and how the application of mediation in the Religious Courts system


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