Board Structure and Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals

Author(s):  
James A. Brickley ◽  
R. Lawrence Lawrence Van Horn ◽  
Gerard J. Wedig
Author(s):  
Colleen M. Boland ◽  
Erica E. Harris ◽  
Christine Petrovits ◽  
Michelle H. Yetman

Using a large sample of nonprofit organizations in the United States reporting governance information on their IRS Forms 990, we develop and evaluate several different composite measures of nonprofit governance. These measures can be used to control for governance broadly in a variety of settings, including research that examines nonprofit funding, reporting quality, and executive compensation. Our results suggest that relatively basic indices perform as well as, and in some cases better than, more complex indices. In fact, when controlling for governance in the standard donations model, the collective evidence indicates that an index computed using the simple sum of five binary indicators (audit committee, majority independent board, no outsourcing, CEO salary review, and information available on website) performs best.


2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Frumkin ◽  
Elizabeth K. Keating

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Prasad ◽  
K. Sankaran ◽  
Nandan Prabhu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017. Findings Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country. Research limitations/implications The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary. Originality/value Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.


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