Third-party fairness maintenance in five types of group relationships

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Zhuang Li ◽  
Gengdan Hu ◽  
Lei Xu ◽  
Yang Rui
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Intergroup Bias ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Group Relationships ◽  
Group Member

To find out if third-party fairness maintenance is affected by group relationships, we divided participants into three groups and had them play a game of third-party fairness maintenance, in which a third party chooses between keeping (not intervening), punishing, or compensating, when the other players face unfair dictator game results. Results show that when faced with in-group unfair events, the third party tended to choose keeping or compensating strategies, and to opt not to intervene in the unfair events of the out-group. This tendency was stronger when both the dictator and the recipient belonged to the same out-group. In addition, there was intergroup bias in maintenance of third-party fairness. When the violator was an in-group member, the third party tended to use keep and compensate strategies, and chose to punish when facing violation by the out-group. Our findings illustrate the influence of group relationships on third-party fairness maintenance.

Optimal trade-in and third-party collection authorization strategies under trade-in subsidy policy

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 854-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaiying Cao ◽  
Qiushi Bo ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to study whether the recycling of a third party competes with the trade-in service of a manufacturer, and explores the optimal trade-in and third-party collection authorization strategies for the manufacturer. Design/methodology/approach According to whether to authorize a third party to collect its used products, the manufacturer has two choices: one is not authorization (NA); the other is authorization (A). This paper uses profit-maximization model to investigate the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the third party under NA and A, respectively, and then explores which choice is better for the manufacturer. Findings It is observed that there is a competition between trade-in service and third-party recycling when the durability parameter of the used product is relatively small. Moreover, when the durability parameter of the used product is relatively large, A is always better choice for the manufacturer; otherwise, NA is a better choice except for the case that the unit trade-in subsidy is low and the salvage of the used product is high. Practical implications These results provide managerial insights for the manufacturer and the third party to make decisions in the field of recycling. Originality/value This paper is among the first papers to study the competition between trade-in program and third party’s collecting program under government’s trade-in subsidy policy. Moreover, this paper presents the conditions under which the manufacturer should authorize or not authorize the third party to collect its used products.

Mrs. Gore's legacy to commerce

Legal Studies ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-295
Author(s):  
P.J. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Legal Liability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Commercial World ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Privity Of Contract

It is commonplace in the commercial world for contractual obligations to be performed by persons other than the original parties to the contract. Because of the doctrine of privity of contract persons who are not party to a contract generally cannot take advantage of terms contained in it. If, therefore, a person undertakhg the performance of obligations which someone else has originally assumed misperforms those tasks so as to incur legal liability towards the other original contracting party, it would seem that he cannot rely on a protecting clause in the contract even though that clause may purport to afford him cover. A variety of avenues of escape from this situation (which is often commerically inconvenient) have been at various times advocated: the doctrine of vicarious immunity and the trust idea have been explored and eventually rejected. Other methods of avoidance retain more vigour: we have probably not heard the last of arguments based on the doctrines of volenti non fit injuria and disclaimer, of the bailment on terms and of the idea of spelling out a separate contract (or offer) between the party now suing and the third party.

scholarly journals Empathy: A clue for prosocialty and driver of indirect reciprocity

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. e0255071
Author(s):  
Frauke von Bieberstein ◽  
Andrea Essl ◽  
Kathrin Friedrich
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Laboratory Study ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Reactivity Index ◽  
Interpersonal Reactivity Index ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

Indirect reciprocity has been proposed to explain prosocial behavior among strangers, whereby the prosocial act is returned by a third party. However, what happens if the prosocial act cannot be observed by the third party? Here, we examine whether empathy serves as a clue for prosociality and whether people are more generous toward more empathetic people. In a laboratory study, we measured prosocial behavior as the amount sent in the dictator game and empathy based on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). By using an incentivized task, we find that people believe that more empathetic participants send more money in the dictator game. Thus, people see empathy as a clue for prosocial behavior. Furthermore, in a second dictator game, participants indirectly reciprocate by sending more money to more empathetic recipients. Therefore, we suggest that empathy can replace a reputation derived from observable prosocial behavior in triggering indirect reciprocity.

scholarly journals La politique comme le lieu de l’universalisation de l’exigence éthique chez Levinas

2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-181
Author(s):  
Ericbert Tambou Kamgue
Keyword(s):  
Final Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
The Third ◽  
Ethical Subjectivity ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Ethical Requirement

Levinasian philosophy is characterized as a philosophy of ethical subjectivity and asymmetrical responsibility. Ethics is understood as the subject that gives itself entirely to the Other. However, the Other is never alone. His face attests to the presence of a third party who, looking at me in his eyes, cries for justice. There is no longer any question for the subject to devote himself entirely to the Other (ethical justice), to give everything to him at the risk of appearing empty-handed before the third party. How then to serve both the Other and the third party? The question of the political appears in the thought of Levinas with the emergence of the third party who, like the Other, challenges me and commands me (social justice). The third party establishes a political space. Politics is in the final analysis the place of the universalization of the ethical requirement born from face-to-face with the face of the Other.

Guarantee and Indemnity

2021 ◽  
pp. 280-294
Author(s):  
Hannah McCarthy
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Essential Characteristic ◽  
The Third ◽  
Specific Event ◽  
The Third Party

This chapter tackles guarantee or bond, which has no definitive judicial definition but is widely held to be a contract in which the guarantor agrees to be answerable for the debt or default of another to a third party. It cites the primary obligation of a third party that is underwritten by the guarantor as an essential characteristic of a guarantee. It also explains how the guarantor becomes answerable for the faults of the third party. This chapter talks about the indemnitor that undertakes a primary liability to another party in order to indemnify the other party against a specific event, which may or may not involve the act or default of a third party. It points out that the indemnity contained in construction sub-contracts is the most frequently used form of indemnity in the construction industry.

20. Personal Liability of Third Parties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Virgo
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Personal Liability

This chapter examines the personal liability of third parties when there is a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty. It explains that there are two types of personal liability of third parties. One is receipt-based liability when a third party has received property in which the beneficiary or principal has an equitable proprietary interest and the other is accessorial liability when the third party has encouraged or assisted a breach of a trust or fiduciary duty. The elements of different causes of action relevant to receipt-based liability and accessorial liability are examined, notably the action for unconscionable receipt and the action of dishonest assistance. The controversial question of whether liability should be strict or fault-based is considered and, if the latter, the nature of the fault requirement.

scholarly journals Kepler’s Tertius Interveniens

1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 51-54
Author(s):  
Ken Negus
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The One

Tertius Interveniens, written in 1610, is one of Kepler's most powerful and passionate treatises on astrology, written as a defence of the subject against extremists on both sides, on the one hand those who would condemn astrology altogether, and on the other those who accepted everything said and done in its name, no matter how preposterous. Hence he is the ‘third party intervening’, as indicated by the title.

20. Personal Liability of Third Parties

2020 ◽  
pp. 624-662
Author(s):  
Graham Virgo
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Personal Liability

This chapter examines the personal liability of third parties when there is a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty. It explains that there are two types of personal liability of third parties. One is receipt-based liability when a third party has received property in which the beneficiary or principal has an equitable proprietary interest and the other is accessorial liability when the third party has encouraged or assisted a breach of a trust or fiduciary duty. The elements of different causes of action relevant to receipt-based liability and accessorial liability are examined, notably the action for unconscionable receipt and the action of dishonest assistance. The controversial question of whether liability should be strict or fault-based is considered and, if the latter, the nature of the fault requirement.

Intergroup Bias Influences Third-Party Punishment and Compensation: In-group Relationships Attenuate Altruistic Punishment

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 1397-1408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingjie Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Bian ◽  
Yu Hu ◽  
Ya-Ting Chen ◽  
Xuzhou Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Intergroup Bias ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Intergroup Relationships ◽  
Trait Empathy ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Group Relationships ◽  
Shed Light

Intergroup relationships can impact on a third party's willingness to punish a violator, but few researchers have explored how intergroup relationships affect third-party compensation tendencies. We recruited 163 participants to observe a dictator game, and then choose either to punish the dictator or compensate the recipient, each of whom could be from the participant's in-group or out-group. Third parties often chose not to punish in-group dictators and to compensate both in-group victims and out-group victims. When out-group members transgressed against the in-group, participants punished these out-group members just as often as they compensated the in-group recipients, although they punished out-group dictators more harshly than others overall. However, when both proposer and recipient came from the out-group, participants often did not intervene. We also found that third-party punishment and compensation were related to individual differences in participants' trait empathy and Machiavellianism. Our findings shed light on the modulating effect of intergroup relationships on third-party altruistic decisions.

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