scholarly journals PHYSICS NEEDS PHILOSOPHY. PHILOSOPHY NEEDS PHYSICS

Metaphysics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 36-46
Author(s):  
C. Rovelli ◽  
I. A Rybakova

Contrary to claims about the irrelevance of philosophy for science, I argue that philosophy has had, and still has, far more influence on physics than is commonly assumed. I maintain that the current anti-philosophical ideology has had damaging effects on the fertility of science. I also suggest that recent important empirical results, such as the detection of the Higgs particle and gravitational waves, and the failure to detect supersymmetry where many expected to find it, question the validity of certain philosophical assumptions common among theoretical physicists, inviting us to engage in a clearer philosophical reflection on scientific method.

2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 473-503
Author(s):  
Korinna Schönhärl

Abstract From the 1880s scientists developed methods to measure (dishonest) tax payment behaviour. The first part of this article provides an overview of these methods and their development. The second part enquires into the function of measuring methods in the societal discourse about (honest) tax payments. The tax morale research of Günter Schmölders, carried out in the 1950s and 1960s, is then examined as a case study. The focus of interest is on the political advice that Schmölders gave, as based on his empirical results, and on the ideal image of the citizen and society which underlay the scientific method.


Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Bruce Thompson ◽  
Maryann Corsello ◽  
Samuel McReynolds ◽  
Bernice Conklin-Powers ◽  
Brittany Morley

Author(s):  
Manel Baucells ◽  
Daniel Smith ◽  
Martin Weber
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