scholarly journals “The Rule of Law Mechanism” and the Hungarian and Polish Resistance: European Law Against National Identity?

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 49-67
Author(s):  
Christoph J. Schewe ◽  
◽  
Thomas Blome ◽  

Similarly to the rest of the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has also hit the European Union (EU) severely. In order to foster the process of the economic recovery of EU Member States, the EU Member States agreed on a financial aid package combined with a regulation – the conditionality mechanism – that provided for financial sanctions in the event of a breach of the rule of law. Given that the positions of Poland and Hungary in the adoption process of this regulation caused a controversy, this article examines general questions on the rule of law, the regulation and the background to the controversy.

Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Dieter Classen

The book presents the constitutional systems of the 27 EU member states in an integrated form. Basic principles such as democracy and the rule of law, constitutionalismincluding constitutional jurisdiction, state organs (parliament, government, head of state) and state functions (legislation, administration, jurisdiction, foreign policy) are dealt with. Thus, common European basic principles are elaborated, but above all, the different manifestations of many constitutional principles are clarified. The book is aimed at all those who wish to inform themselves in a clear form about the constitutional systems of the EU member states on which the European Union is based.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 196-211
Author(s):  
Nikos Lavranos

This article examines the potential consequences of the termination agreement recently signed by 23 EU Member States, which will soon terminate the existing intra- EU BIT S of the signatory Member States. The author concludes that the retroactive application of the termination agreement to disputes that have been initiated before this termination agreement enters into force is a serious violation of the Rule of Law. He also finds that the Facilitator procedure offered by the termination agreement is not a suitable tool to settle any ongoing intra- EU BIT disputes. In light of the significant shortcomings in the judicial legal systems of many EU Member States, the author calls for the adoption of an EU Investment Protection Regulation as well as the creation of a European Investment Court. Finally, despite the fact that the termination agreement is not intended to apply to intra- EU ECT disputes, the author expects that the fallout of the Achmea judgment will lead to substantial “reforms” of the ECT in due course. All these developments will inevitably lead to a lower standard of investment and investor protection within the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 100 (7) ◽  
pp. 37-45
Author(s):  
Stanislav Kuvaldin ◽  

Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union envisages a mechanism for responding to breaching by Member States the values of democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights proclaimed by the Union, as well as the introduction of sanctions. Nevertheless, the EU structures are extremely cautious about this mechanism, despite the reasons for its application. The article analyzes the history of this clause in European legislation and the first attempts to influence dubious decisions of the Member States. The author explores the cases of Poland and Hungary in light of discussions to initiate the Article 7 procedures against these countries. It is concluded that such an outcome is unlikely. It is highlighted that the clause was deliberately formulated so that it allows to limit the actions of European institutions, to leave decisions in the hands of national governments and to provide an opportunity to settle the disput through negotiations. The author explores the internal discussions of alternative ways to influence values-violating Member States.


Author(s):  
Aleksandar-Andrija Pejović

In recent years, the rule of law and, especially, its “proper” implementation has become one of the most debated topics in Europe in recent years. The “Big Bang Enlargement” marked the beginning of dilemmas whether the new EU Member States fulfil the necessary rule of law criteria and opened the way for divergent views on how to implement TEU Article 2 values in practice. Furthermore, constant problems and difficulty of the candidate countries to fulfil the necessary rule of law criteria added to the complexity of the problem. In turn, the European institutions have tried to introduce a series of mechanisms and procedures to improve the oversight and make the states follow the rules - starting from the famous Treaty on the European Union (TEU) Article 7, the Rule of Law Mechanism, annual reports on the rule of law and the most recent Conditionality Regulation. The Conditionality Regulation was finally adopted in December 2020 after much discussion and opposition from certain EU Member States. It calls for the suspension of payments, commitments and disbursement of instalments, and a reduction of funding in the cases of general deficiencies with the rule of law. On the other hand, similar provisions were laid out in the February 2020 enlargement negotiation methodology specifying that in the cases of no progress, imbalance of the overall negotiations or regression, the scope and intensity of pre-accession assistance can be adjusted downward thus descaling financial assistance to candidate countries. The similarities between the two mechanisms, one for the Member States, the other for candidate countries shows an increased sharing of experiences and approaches to dealing with possible deficiencies or breaches of the rule of law through economic sanctioning, in order to resolve challenges to the unity of the European union. The Covid-19 pandemic and the crisis it has provoked on many fronts has turned the attention of the Member States (i.e. the Council) away from the long running problematic issues. Consequently, the procedures against Poland and Hungary based on the Rule of Law Mechanism have slowed down or become fully stalled, while certain measures taken up by some European states have created concerns about the limitations of human rights and liberties. This paper, therefore, analyses the efforts the EU is making in protecting the rule of law in its Member States and the candidate countries. It also analyses the new focus of the EU in the financial area where it has started to develop novel mechanisms that would affect one of the most influential EU tools – the funding of member and candidate countries through its structural and enlargement policy. Finally, it attempts to determine and provide conclusions on the efficiency of new instruments with better regulated criteria and timing of activities will be and how much they would affect the EU and its current and future member states.


Significance Available second-quarter data indicate a shallower recession in most of the eleven eastern EU member states (EU-11) than the rest of the EU in January-June. This may be due to a strong start in January-February, followed by strict but shorter lockdowns and macroeconomic measures introduced to smooth the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact. However, the number of cases is still a concern. Impacts Projections for economic recovery in the second part of the year will be subject to downside risks. European solidarity will likely continue to be tested by political controversy over the rule of law. A European-wide vision for green, digital transformation and resilience may emerge.


Author(s):  
S. Kuvaldin

The article discusses the possible introduction of the rule-of-law conditionality, linking the provision of payments from the EU budget with the observance of the principles of the rule of law by the Member States. It is noted that some other tools previously used to achieve integrity of values in the EU have proved to be inefficient. In particular, all attempts to impose sanctions provided for by Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union for violating the principles of the rule of law against Poland and Hungary have not yet led to any result. At the same time, one can see how different conditionalities for receiving funds or other benefits from the EU are becoming an increasingly common internal EU governance mechanism, although initially this tool was used mainly in building external relations. It should be noted that the possibility of budgetary sanctions is spelled out in the draft budget, but the mechanism for their introduction is not precisely defined. This is partly due to the need to reach a consensus at the EU summit, which agreed on the budget in July 2020. European leaders opted for vague language for the budget sanctions mechanism to be approved in principle. This once again shows the complexity of making tough decisions within the EU. Nevertheless, one can see the consistent actions of European structures and Member States to provide a new mechanism for the protection of European values. The economic nature of this mechanism, as well as its relative effectiveness in other areas, may increase the interest of a number of EU Member States in it. This creates a potential risk for the authorities of Poland and Hungary, which may lose some of the subsidies from the EU. However, it cannot be ruled out that the EU approach of seeking a compromise will prevail even after a new sanctions instrument appears at its disposal.


2020 ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
Stanislav Kuvaldin ◽  

Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union provides for a mechanism for responding to violations by member states of the values of democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights proclaimed by the Union, as well as the introduction of sanctions against the violating state. Nevertheless, the EU structures are extremely cautious about this mechanism, despite the reasons for its use. The article analyzes the history of the appearance of Article 7 in European legislation and the first attempts of a pan-European influence on dubious decisions of the member states. Based on the example of Poland and Hungary in respect of which the possibility of applying sanctions under the Article 7 procedure is now being discussed, it is concluded that such an outcome is unlikely. It is shown that Article 7 was deliberately created in such a way as to limit the actions of pan-European structures, to leave decisions in the hands of national governments and to provide an opportunity to solve the problem through negotiations. It also shows the process of searching for alternative ways of influencing the violating states.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


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